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STUDENTS, SECURITY, AND RACE
Jason P. Nance∗
ABSTRACT
In the wake of the terrible shootings in Newtown, Connecticut, our nation
has turned its attention to school security. For example, several states have
passed or are considering passing legislation that will provide new funding to
schools for security equipment and law enforcement officers. Strict security
measures in schools are certainly not new. In response to prior acts of school
violence, many public schools for years have relied on metal detectors, random
sweeps, locked gates, surveillance cameras, and law enforcement officers to
promote school safety. Before policymakers and school officials invest more
money in strict security measures, this Article provides additional factors that
should be considered. First, drawing on recent, restricted data from the U.S.
Department of Education, this Article presents an original empirical analysis
revealing that low-income students and minority students are much more likely
to experience intense security conditions in their schools than other students,
even when taking into account neighborhood crime, school crime, and school
disorder. These findings raise concerns that such inequalities may continue or
worsen as policymakers provide additional funding for security measures.
Second, this Article argues that strict security measures do not support longterm solutions needed to effectively prevent school violence. Indeed, strict
security measures may exacerbate the underlying problems by creating
barriers of adversity and mistrust between students and educators.
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In addition, this Article offers recommendations to address the
disproportionate use of security measures on low-income and minority
students and to curb violence more effectively. It urges school officials and
policymakers to support programs that build trust and collective responsibility
instead of providing grants for strict security measures. Further, it
recommends that the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights play a
more active role in addressing the disproportionate use of strict security
measures on minority students.
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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps never before has our nation been more focused on school security.
The horrific massacre of twenty children and six educators at Sandy Hook
Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, on December 14, 2012, has
provoked intense feelings of sadness, anger, and perplexity.1 Naturally,
parents, educators, policymakers, and communities are searching for
immediate solutions to ensure students’ safety.2 In response to this tragedy,
many state legislatures and local school boards are considering whether to
allocate additional funding to schools for purchasing security equipment and
hiring law enforcement officers.3
1 See, e.g., Tom Raum & Jennifer Agiesta, Poll: Americans Angrier About Sandy Hook than 9/11
Attacks, CNSNEWS (Jan. 16, 2013), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/poll-americans-angrier-about-sandyhook-shooting-911-attacks (reporting the anger Americans feel over the shootings); Jeanette Rundquist,
Surprise Security Drills Coming to N.J. Schools, NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 2013, 9:07 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/
index.ssf/2013/01/surprise_school_security_drills.html (“The tragedy in Connecticut was the school
community’s 9/11. This has touched the very soul of the country, no less the school community.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
2 See, e.g., Stephanie Banchero & Caroline Porter, In Pursuit of Safety, Schools’ Paths Diverge:
Districts Face Tight Budgets, Worries over Armed Security on Campus as They Respond to the Massacre at
Sandy Hook, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2013, 7:49 PM) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732378370
4578248113754373942.html (“Schools are running security drills, planning to install security cameras and
bullet-proof glass, and hiring safety consultants.”); Lynh Bui, Montgomery County Parents Ask for More
School Security, Teacher Training During Budget Hearing, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2013, 3:15 PM) http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/maryland-schools-insider/post/montgomery-county-parents-ask-for-more-schoolsecurity-teacher-training-during-budget-hearing/2013/01/11/e8d3dcf4-5aab-11e2-9fa9-5fbdc9530eb9_blog.
html (explaining the increased concerns parents have for their children’s safety and their demand for increased
on-campus security); Motoko Rich, School Officials Look Again at Security Measures Once Dismissed, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/education/after-newtown-shootings-schoolsconsider-armed-security-officers.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (describing the reactions of policymakers to the
Newtown shootings).
3 See, e.g., H.B. 612, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2013) (proposing funding to school districts for
“surveillance cameras, metal detectors, and other safety equipment”); S.B. 2230, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2013) (funding security aid to provide schools with metal detectors, electronically operated partitions, and
security cameras); S.B. 2267, 63d Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2013) (proposing funding to equip schools with alarms,
cameras, electronic door locks, emergency response call buttons, intercom systems, key or pass card systems,
and metal detectors); H. 2343, Public School Security Equipment Grant Act of 2013, ch. 608 (Va. 2013)
(providing funding to schools to for purchasing security equipment); see also Doug Finke, State Board of
Education Calls for $874M Increase in School Funding, PJSTAR (Jan. 24, 2013, 9:02 PM), http://www.
pjstar.com/news/x1503807290/State-Board-of-Education-calls-for-874M-increase-in-school-funding
(“The
Illinois State Board of Education called for an $874 million increase in state spending on elementary and
secondary education on Thursday, including $20 million that would be available for school security
measures.”); Mary Wilson, Pa. Senate Leader Suggests Steep Increase in School Security Funding,
NEWSWORKS (Jan 22, 2013), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/item/49955-pa-senate-leadersuggests-steep-increase-in-school-security-funding?linktype=hp_topstorylist (“The leader of Pennsylvania’s
Senate wants to increase grant funding twentyfold for school security, including armed guards.”); Liz Hayes,
Burrell Board Focuses on School Safety, TRIBLIVE (May 7, 2013, 12:51 AM), http://triblive.com/
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Before policymakers and school officials make these substantial financial
commitments, there is much to consider. Just two days prior to the shootings,
on December 12, 2012, another event took place that has since been
overshadowed by the Newtown tragedy, but is related to the current response.
On that day, a U.S. congressional hearing was held to discuss, for the first
time, ending the so-called school-to-prison pipeline.4 The school-to-prison
pipeline refers to the practice of funneling students directly to the juvenile
correction system from schools, or suspending or expelling students from
schools, thereby creating conditions where those students are more likely to be
arrested.5 This disturbing trend disproportionately affects minority students,
especially African-American boys, depriving many of these students of the
benefits of an education, future employment, and participation in our
democracy.6
While violence and school safety are serious issues that must be addressed,
the congressional hearing held just two days before the Newtown shootings
highlights another serious problem that our nation faces: the disparate
treatment of minority students in public schools. To further illustrate, earlier in
2012, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR)
released data from a national survey of over 72,000 schools around the country
serving approximately eighty-five percent of the nation’s students.7 The results
were troubling, but not surprising. The data revealed that minority students
across the country are disciplined more often and more severely than white

neighborhoods/yourallekiskivalley/yourallekiskivalleymore/3970294-74/burrell-security-wagner#axzz2TH
QXVCDR (discussing a Pennsylvania School District that is considering using metal detectors more regularly,
installing X-ray equipment to screen student backpacks, and making windows “more bulletproof”); Tom
Barton, Board Members Unsure Metal Detectors Needed at Beaufort County Schools, ISLAND PACKET.COM
(May 8, 2013), http://www.islandpacket.com/2013/05/08/2495164/board-members-unsure-metal-detectors.
html (discussing a South Carolina School Board’s consideration of adding metal detectors in schools).
4 See, Ending the School-to-Prison Pipeline Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Human Rights, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?
id=b61e5f08eadf22b2ec4ab964fc64ae9f; Susan Ferriss, ‘School to Prison Pipeline’ Hit on Capitol Hill, CTR.
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Dec. 13, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/12/13/11921/schoolprison-pipeline-hit-capitol-hill.
5 See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., FEDERAL POLICY, ESEA REAUTHORIZATION, AND THE
SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 2 (2011), available at http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/ceb35d4874b0ffde10_ubm
6baeap.pdf; NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., School to Prison Pipeline, NAACPLDF, http://www.
naacpldf.org/case/school-prison-pipeline (last visited Aug. 12, 2013).
6 Id.
7 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., New Data from U.S. Department of Education Highlights
Educational Inequalities Around Teacher Experience, Discipline, and High School Rigor (Mar. 6, 2012),
available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/new-data-us-department-education-highlights-educationalinequities-around-teache.
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students, have less access to higher-level courses, and more often have teachers
that are less experienced and are lower paid.8 In response to these findings,
U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan stated that the “undeniable truth is
that the everyday educational experience for many students of color violates
the principle of equity at the heart of the American promise.”9 Indeed, the
disparate treatment of minorities in schools, especially of black males, is well
documented in the literature.10
While Congress, the U.S. Department of Education, and scholars have
rightfully directed their attention to these disconcerting inequalities, another
inequality in public education has received far less attention. This inequality
also affects the everyday educational experience of many minority students
and low-income students and could become more severe if policymakers
decide to direct additional money to schools for security measures. I refer to
the disproportionate use of strict security measures.11 Strict security measures
include using metal detectors, conducting random sweeps for contraband,
hiring law enforcement officers or guards, controlling access to school
grounds, and installing security cameras. These measures, particularly when
used in combination, can create an intense, prison-like environment that
deteriorates the learning climate.12 As a result, the educational experiences of
many minority students and low-income students are often far different—and
far worse—than the everyday educational experiences of other students.

8

Id.
Id.
10 See e.g., CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM
53–54 (2010) (describing the overrepresentation of children of color in restrictive special education programs);
Angela A. Ciolfi & James E. Ryan, Race and Response-to-Intervention in Special Education, 54 HOW. L.J.
303, 326–27 (2011) (explaining that African-American students are overrepresented in restrictive educational
settings such as alternative schools and other disciplinary programs); Nancy E. Dowd, What Men? The
Essentialist Error of the “End of Men,” 93 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (describing the physical
marginalization, the pattern of disproportionate discipline, and the overidentification and misidentification of
learning disabilities of black males in school); Theresa Glennon, Knocking Against the Rocks: Evaluating
Institutional Practices and the African American Boy, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 10, 11 (2002) (explaining
that black males are more likely to be identified as disabled and are more likely to be placed in educational
programs that exert greater control and provide fewer services than other children); Theresa Glennon, Looking
for Air: Excavating Destructive Educational and Racial Policies to Build Successful School Communities, in
JUSTICE FOR KIDS: KEEPING KIDS OUT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 107, 110–11 (Nancy E. Dowd ed.,
2011) (citing studies demonstrating that minority students are disproportionately disciplined); Russell J. Skiba,
Suzanne E. Eckes & Kevin Brown, African American Disproportionality in School Discipline: The Divide
Between Best Evidence and Legal Remedy, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1071, 1086–89 (2009/2010) (discussing
the vast empirical evidence of racial disproportionality in school discipline).
11 See infra Part III.
12 See infra Part II.
9
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Before embarking on a new phase of security upgrades, policymakers and
school officials should first examine the disproportionate use of strict security
measures on minorities and low-income students and consider using alternative
means to reduce violence that do not degrade the learning environment.
This Article goes beyond the current literature in three ways. First, drawing
on a large, national, restricted-access dataset recently released by the
Department of Education, this Article empirically demonstrates that student
race and student poverty are strong predictors for whether a school chooses to
implement a combination of strict security measures, even after accounting for
factors such as school crime, neighborhood crime, school disorder, school
location, and school size.13
Second, this Article describes the current legal landscape in which these
disparities have developed. Specifically, as school safety and discipline have
become more pressing concerns for schools over the last three decades, courts
have substantially weakened students’ Fourth Amendment rights.14 Courts
generally permit school officials to employ many types of suspicionless search
practices to assist school officials in their efforts to prevent school crime,
particularly when those searches are considered to be minimally intrusive.15 In
addition, as part of the recent school accountability movement, federal and
state laws require students to be tested each year and impose harsh
consequences for failing to meet certain standards.16 Accordingly, schools have
an incentive to push low-performing students out of schools by intensifying
their surveillance methods.17 Further, federal and state programs have
encouraged the use of such measures by providing money to schools to buy
equipment and hire law enforcement officers.18 With minimal oversight from
courts, the recent accountability movement, and significant funding from
federal and state governments to purchase strict security measures, the
conditions have been set for yet another inequality to emerge in our public
schools.
Third, this Article proposes several recommendations to address these
disparities. It urges school officials and policymakers to voluntarily adopt
alternative, more effective means to curb school crime and violence instead of
13
14
15
16
17
18

See infra Part III.
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.D.
See infra Part I.D.
See infra Part I.C.
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resorting to methods that rely on coercion, punishment, and fear. A growing
body of research shows that programs promoting a strong sense of community
and collective responsibility (a) effectively reduce school crime and student
misbehavior without degrading the learning environment and (b) teach students
how to resolve conflicts peacefully. Indeed, schools can do much more to
prevent violence in our schools and communities by investing in these
alternative measures than by purchasing security equipment and hiring law
enforcement officers.19 In addition, this Article encourages federal and state
agencies to stop providing money to schools for strict security measures and to
use that money to promote these alternative measures. Finally, it recommends
that the OCR take an active role in preventing the disproportionate use of strict
security measures on minority students.20
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the development of the
law that allows and motivates school officials to use a variety of strict security
measures on students. Part II describes educational and sociological
considerations against adopting strict security measures in schools.
Additionally, it discusses the reasons why the disparate use of strict security
measures on minorities is particularly harmful. Part III presents the results of
the empirical analysis revealing the disparate use of strict security measures
along racial and economic lines. Part IV evaluates the concerns presented in
the empirical findings and recommends measures to address those concerns. It
also urges school officials to adopt alternative measures that will more
effectively reduce violence in our schools and communities.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
In the last three decades, students’ Fourth Amendment rights have steadily
declined as the U.S. Supreme Court has provided school officials with more
constitutional leeway to maintain order and discipline.21 School officials are
19

See infra Part IV.B.
In a subsequent scholarly article, I also intend to describe an alternative framework that courts should
employ to evaluate students’ Fourth Amendment rights in schools. See infra note 313.
21 See Jason P. Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches of Students’ Belongings: A Legal, Empirical, and
Normative Analysis, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 367 (2013); see also James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public
Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1415 (2000) (explaining that “the Court’s decisions regarding student searches
rest on the value-laden view that maintaining discipline is necessary to preserve the educational process of
schools”). Scholars have long debated how far students’ constitutional rights should extend in schools. But, as
Catherine Kim recently observed, “both sides of the debate share a common starting point: such restrictions
must be justified, if at all, by pedagogical goals.” Catherine Y. Kim, Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 861, 866 (2012); see also, e.g., Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights?
20
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not required to obtain a warrant, show probable cause, or even have an
individualized suspicion that a student participated in wrongdoing before
conducting a search.22 The absence of any meaningful protections from
random, suspicionless searches has created an environment in which school
officials can now freely employ a variety of strict security measures, even
when those measures have the cumulative effect of creating an intense
environment that is detrimental to learning.23 In addition, federal and state laws
have motivated schools to purchase strict security measures and intensify their
surveillance methods.24 These conditions set the stage for another racial
inequality to develop in our public schools.
A. The Foundational Cases
The U.S. Supreme Court evaluated students’ Fourth Amendment rights in
schools for the first time in New Jersey v. T.L.O. and initiated what would
become a steady decline of those rights.25 In T.L.O., a school official searched
high school freshman T.L.O.’s purse for cigarettes after a teacher claimed that
she spotted T.L.O. smoking in the bathroom and T.L.O. denied the
accusation.26 During the search, the school official discovered marijuana and
other materials suggesting that T.L.O. was dealing marijuana.27 The school
official turned the evidence over to the police, who brought delinquency
charges against T.L.O. in juvenile court.28 T.L.O. moved to suppress the
evidence, arguing that the school official’s search violated the Fourth
Amendment.29 The Supreme Court disagreed.30
Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 53 (1996) (applauding the Supreme Court’s
recent jurisprudence that restricts students’ Fourth Amendment rights because doing so enhances the ability of
school officials to provide students with a serious education); Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship:
The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1648–49
(1986) (describing the need to find an equilibrium between respecting students’ constitutional rights so that
students learn to value those rights, and restricting students’ rights to help school officials maintain an orderly
environment conducive to learning); Ryan, supra, at 1338–43, 1424–26 (maintaining that when a school
engages in its core, universal function of imparting academic and vocational skills, it should be treated more
deferentially and given some constitutional leeway to achieve its goals).
22 See Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653–54 (1995); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985).
23 See infra Part I.B.
24 See infra Part I.C.
25 See Nance, supra note 21, at 376–94.
26 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 328–29.
29 Id. at 329.
30 See id. at 332–33.

NANCE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

9/24/2013 12:07 PM

STUDENTS, SECURITY, AND RACE

9

The Court evaluated the constitutionality of the search by balancing
T.L.O.’s expectation of privacy against the school’s need to maintain an
orderly environment conducive to learning.31 The Court first explained that
students have legitimate expectations of privacy in the personal items they
bring to school.32 At the same time, the Court recognized that school officials
also have an important need to maintain an appropriate learning environment.33
To strike a balance, the Court held that school officials were not required to
obtain a warrant before searching a student, and a school official’s level of
suspicion need not rise to the level of “probable cause.”34 Rather, the
constitutionality of a search in school would depend on its reasonableness
under the circumstances.35 The determination of “reasonableness” is a two-fold
inquiry: (1) “‘whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,’” and (2)
“whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’”36 Using
this framework, the Court concluded that the search was constitutional.37
Although the search in T.L.O. was based on individualized suspicion, the
Court emphasized that it was not deciding whether individualized suspicion
was essential to justify a search conducted by school authorities.38 Ten years
later, however, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,39 the Court
determined that individualized suspicion was unnecessary to conduct
minimally intrusive searches of students when certain conditions are present.40
In Vernonia, the Court evaluated a school district’s suspicionless drugtesting program on student athletes.41 Students wishing to participate in
interscholastic sports would be tested at the beginning of the season, and each
week of the season a student, under the supervision of two adults, would

31

Id. at 339–40.
See id. at 337–38 (“A search of a child’s person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person,
no less than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective
expectations of privacy.” (footnote omitted)).
33 Id. at 339 (citing NAT’L INST. OF EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, VIOLENT
SCHOOLS––SAFE SCHOOLS: THE SAFE SCHOOL STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (1978)).
34 See id. at 340–41.
35 Id. at 337.
36 Id. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
37 Id. at 343.
38 See id. at 342 n.8 (“We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the
reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities.”).
39 Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
40 Id. at 653.
41 Id. at 650.
32
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blindly select ten percent of the student-athlete population for drug testing.42 In
fall 1991, James Acton, a seventh-grade student who was well behaved and
who did not have a drug problem, signed up to play football.43 The school
officials would not allow James to participate in school athletics because he
and his parents refused to sign a drug-testing consent form.44 The Actons
claimed that Vernonia’s drug-testing program violated the Fourth Amendment,
but the Court disagreed.45
After dispensing with the individualized suspicion requirement,46 the Court
established a new framework for evaluating suspicionless searches. Under its
new framework, the Court balanced three factors: (1) “the scope of the
legitimate expectation of privacy at issue”; (2) “the character of the intrusion
that is complained of”; and (3) “the nature and immediacy of the governmental
concern at issue . . . and the efficacy of this means for meeting it.”47 The Court
applied these factors in the following manner. First, while acknowledging that
students retained some expectation of privacy while at school, the Court
explained that the scope of students’ privacy rights “are different in public
schools than elsewhere.”48 According to the Court, “the ‘reasonableness’
inquiry [could not] disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary
responsibilit[ies],” requiring students’ expectation of privacy to be
diminished.49 Next, the Court considered drug tests to be minimally intrusive
because drug-testing conditions resembled conditions that students commonly
encounter in public restrooms.50 Finally, the Court determined that the school
district’s interest in deterring drug use was important and immediate in light of
the rampant use of drugs among the student athletes in Vernonia School
District, outweighing any right of privacy the student-athletes possessed.51
42

Id.
See Robert M. Bloom, The Story of Pottawatomie County v. Lindsay Earls: Drug Testing in the Public
Schools, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES 337, 346 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2008) (“At
the time, James said, ‘I was like one of the smartest kids in class. I never got a referral (to the principal’s
office) and I thought that was probably enough for them to see I wasn’t taking drugs.’”).
44 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 651.
45 Id. at 651, 664–65.
46 Id. at 653 (“The school search we approved in T.L.O., while not based on probable cause, was based
on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. As we explicitly acknowledged, however, ‘the Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.’” (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8
(1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
47 Id. at 654, 658, 660.
48 Id. at 656.
49 See id.
50 Id. at 658.
51 Id. at 661–63.
43
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In her dissent, Justice O’Connor criticized the Court’s decision to further
restrict students’ Fourth Amendment rights by eliminating the individualized
suspicion requirement.52 Justice O’Connor believed that suspicionless searches
send a harmful pedagogical message to students: that school officials do not
trust students, and that students have to prove their innocence to school
officials.53 She argued,
[I]ntrusive, blanket searches of schoolchildren, most of whom are
innocent, for evidence of serious wrongdoing are not part of any
traditional school function of which I am aware. Indeed, many
schools, like many parents, prefer to trust their children unless given
reason to do otherwise. As James Acton’s father said on the witness
stand, “[suspicionless testing] sends a message to children that are
trying to be responsible citizens . . . that they have to prove that
they’re innocent . . . , and I think that kind of sets a bad tone for
54
citizenship.”

Seven years later, in Board of Education v. Earls,55 the Court arguably
abridged students’ Fourth Amendment rights even further. There, the Court
upheld a program requiring students enrolled in extracurricular activities to
submit to random drug testing.56 But unlike in Vernonia, where the Court
justified those suspicionless searches in part because the drug problem in the
district was “alarming,” the school district in Earls had made no such
showing.57
In Earls, Lindsay Earls, a student enrolled in “the show choir, the marching
band, the Academic Team, and the National Honor Society,” challenged
Pottawatomie School District’s drug-testing policy as unconstitutional.58 Earls
argued that Pottawatomie had failed to identify a special need for
implementing its random drug-testing program, because it had not
demonstrated that her school had a drug problem.59 In a five-to-four decision,
the Supreme Court upheld Pottawatomie’s drug-testing policy.60

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 681 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 682.
Id. (all but the first alteration in original) (quoting Tr. 9 (Apr. 29, 1992)).
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
Id. at 825.
Id. at 849 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 826–27 (majority opinion).
Id. at 827.
Id. at 824–25.
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The Court balanced the same three factors that it did in Vernonia, largely
reaching the same conclusions.61 However, while noting that Pottawatomie
“presented specific evidence of drug use,” the Court held that it was
unnecessary to identify a drug abuse problem before imposing a suspicionless
drug-testing policy.62 The Court justified the program because “the nationwide
drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every
school.”63 This broad holding has provided a clear path for schools to conduct
a sweeping array of suspicionless search practices without first having to
demonstrate a drug or weapons problem.64
B. Lower Courts Permit Schools to Employ a Host of Random, Suspicionless
Search Practices
The foundational cases illustrate that as school safety and discipline have
become more pressing concerns, students’ Fourth Amendment rights have
steadily declined. As a result of this movement in the law, lower courts
routinely justify the use of a variety of random, suspicionless search practices
in schools. For example, courts uniformly permit schools to use metal detectors
(whether hand-held or walk-through).65 Courts uphold random, suspicionless

61

Id. at 830–38; see also Nance, supra note 21, at 384–87.
Earls, 536 U.S. at 834–35.
63 Id. at 834.
64 See infra Part III. But see Nance, supra note 21, at 391–94 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment
requires school officials to have particularized evidence of a substance use or weapons problem before
performing suspicionless searches that are “highly intrusive,” such as a search through a student’s personal
belongings).
More recently, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a student search in Safford Unified
School District Number 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009). In Redding, the Court did not evaluate the
constitutionality of a random, suspicionless search as it did in Vernonia and Earls; instead, the Court evaluated
the legality of a strip search performed on a thirteen-year-old female student who was accused of bringing
unauthorized prescription and over-the-counter drugs to school. Id. at 368. Relying on the same two factors the
Court presented in T.L.O., the Court concluded that the search violated the Constitution because it was
excessively intrusive in light of the age of the student and the nature of the school violation. Id. at 378 (citing
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)). Nevertheless, the Court refused to hold the school officials
accountable because the school officials were protected under the qualified immunity doctrine. Id. at 378–79.
As some scholars have noted, this case demonstrates how difficult it is for students to recover for unlawful
searches. E.g., Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth Amendment
Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 947–54 (2011) (explaining the impediments
for students to recover for unlawful searches).
65 Cases that permit the use of metal detectors include Hough v. Shakopee Pub. Sch., 608 F. Supp. 2d
1087, 1104 (D. Minn. 2009); In re F.B., 726 A.2d 361, 366 (Pa. 1999); In re Latasha W., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886,
886–87 (Ct. App. 1998); and State v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316, 319–20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
62
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searches of students’ lockers.66 Further, if the issue were presented to courts,
courts most likely would justify the use of surveillance cameras in public
spaces at schools on the theory that recording individuals in public places is
minimally intrusive.67
But perhaps more importantly, there is no law prohibiting school officials
from using a combination of these strict security measures, even when their
cumulative use creates an intense environment that is not conducive to a
healthy learning climate. For example, many schools monitor students by using
a combination of metal detectors, random sweeps, surveillance cameras,
locked gates, and law enforcement officers.68 While courts may deem each of
these measures as “minimally intrusive” or not a cognizable search at all under
the Fourth Amendment, arguably the cumulative effect of using all of these
measures together amounts to a substantial invasion of students’ privacy,
harming students’ educational progress.69
C. Federal and State Programs Have Encouraged the Use of Strict Security
Measures
Not only do courts permit the use of strict security measures, but federal
and state programs have encouraged the use of such measures by providing
money to schools to buy equipment and hire law enforcement officers. For
example, under the U.S. Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS) initiatives, schools could request up to $500,000 to support

66 Cases that uphold random locker searches include State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 150 (Iowa 2003);
In re Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Wis. 1993); and In re Patrick Y., 746 A.2d 405, 414–15 (Md. 2000). For
an extended discussion on the disagreement among courts regarding whether students possess an expectation
of privacy in their lockers, see KIM ET AL., supra note 10, at 115–17; Feld, supra note 64, at 933–37; and
Nance, supra note 21, at 411–12 and accompanying notes. Further, there is no rational basis to conclude that
students should lose their expectation of privacy in their personal belongings simply because they place them
in their lockers. See Nance, supra note 21, at 411–12 and accompanying notes.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Videotaping of suspects in
public places, such as banks, does not violate the [F]ourth [A]mendment . . . .”). In certain locations, however,
video surveillance—particularly surreptitious video surveillance—inappropriately intrudes on liberties that are
fundamental to human dignity. See Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 499 (6th Cir. 2008)
(holding that surreptitious video surveillance of a student locker room violates the Fourth Amendment because
the surveillance intrudes on a student’s inherent right to bodily privacy).
68 See infra Part III.
69 See infra Part IV. The fact that the cumulative effect of using several strict measures together arguably
amounts to a substantial invasion of students’ privacy provides justification for courts to apply a modified
framework under the Fourth Amendment. I will explore this concept in greater detail in a subsequent scholarly
article.
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half the cost of a security program.70 Schools used the awarded funds for metal
detectors, locks, lighting, security assessments, security training of personnel,
coordination with local law enforcement, and other deterrent measures.71 On
September 8, 2011, COPS announced more than $13 million in grants to local
law enforcement agencies and municipalities to enhance school safety in
thirty-two states.72 Since 1995, COPS has invested approximately $913 million
in school security measures across the country.73 In another example, under the
Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act,74 Congress authorized
disbursements to state and local education agencies for “[a]cquiring and
installing metal detectors, electronic locks, surveillance cameras, or other
related equipment and technologies.”75
In addition, several states currently make grants available to schools for
strict security measures,76 and the Newtown tragedy has motivated other state
70 See Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., 2011 Secure Our Schools Program, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2011AwardDocs/CSPP-SOS-CHP/SOSMethodology.pdf (last visited
Aug. 12, 2013).
71 Id.
72 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., U.S. Department of
Justice COPS Office Announces over $13 Million in School Safety Grants (Sept. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=2599.
73 See Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., Fact Sheet: Secure Our Schools, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(Sept. 2011), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2011AwardDocs/CSPP-SOS-CHP/2011-SOS-Post-FactSheet.
pdf.
74 20 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7165 (2006).
75 Id. § 7115(b)(2)(E)(ii). Notably, the grant application procedures make clear that the Department of
Education views school security equipment as only one component to an overall strategy designed to create a
safe and healthy learning environment. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. ET AL., SAFE SCHOOLS/HEALTHY STUDENTS:
INFORMATION AND APPLICATION PROCEDURES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 22 (2009), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/dvpsafeschools/2009-184l.pdf. In the 2009 application, no more than ten
percent of the grant could be used to fund security equipment. Id. The remainder of the grant must be used for
programs designed to address student safety and health holistically by providing behavioral, social, and
emotional support; mental health services; early childhood social and emotional learning programs; and
alcohol, tobacco, and other drug prevention activities for students, their families, and the community. Id. at
22–24. This funding initiative currently is suspended. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Safe Schools-Healthy Students
Initiative: Application Information, ED.GOV, http://www2.ed.gov/programs/dvpsafeschools/applicant.html
(last modified Nov. 4, 2011).
76 See ALA. CODE § 41-15B-2.2 (2012) (“School Safety Enhancement Programs eligible for grants shall
be designed to prevent or reduce violence in the schools . . . . The programs shall relate to one or more of the
following: . . . (v) Safety plans involving the use of metal detectors, other security devices, uniforms, school
safety resource officers, or other personnel employed to provide a safe school environment.”); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-2-1185 (West 2012) (“A public school may request funding assistance from the state for the installation
of safety equipment including, but not limited to, video surveillance cameras, metal detectors, and other
similar security devices.”); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302-A (West 2012) (“[T]he office is authorized to make
targeted grants to school entities to fund programs which address school violence, including . . . metal
detectors, protective lighting, surveillance equipment . . . and training in the use of security-related
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legislatures to pass or consider passing legislation that will funnel additional
money to schools for school security.77 No doubt such initiatives will continue
to serve as a strong impetus for many schools to adopt strict security measures,
especially as many parents and other community members demand that
policymakers and school officials respond to the Newtown shootings.
D. The School Accountability Laws May Motivate Schools to Adopt Strict
Security Measures
Further, school accountability laws may motivate some school officials to
adopt strict security measures as part of an overall effort to push lowperforming students out of their schools. Federal and state laws require
students to be tested each year and carry harsh consequences for schools that
fail to meet certain standards. For example, under the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001 (NCLBA),78 all schools receiving federal funds must test students
at various points during grades three through twelve in reading, language arts,
math, and science and demonstrate improvement across all subgroups of
students.79 Schools that do not meet these standards risk receiving a negative
label, being placed on probation, and eventually being taken over by the
state.80 Many scholars argue that schools have an incentive to push lowperforming students out by suspending, expelling, or referring low-performing
students to the juvenile justice system under their zero-tolerance policies.81 As
technology.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-66-30 (2012) (“Using funds appropriated by the General Assembly, each
public middle, junior high, and high school in the State must be equipped with one hand-held metal detector.”).
77 See supra note 3.
78 Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
79 Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres, Introduction to SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE: CULTURES OF
CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 1, 5 (Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres, eds. 2010); U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
Testing: Frequently Asked Questions, ED.GOV, http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/accountability/ayp/testing-faq.html
(last visited on Aug. 12, 2013).
80 Monahan & Torres, supra note 79, at 5.
81 See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW “ZERO TOLERANCE” AND
HIGH-STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 28–33 (2010), available at
http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/d05cb2181a4545db07_r2im6caqe.pdf; Linda Darling-Hammond, Race,
Inequality, and Educational Accountability: The Irony of ‘No Child Left Behind,’ 10 RACE, ETHNICITY &
EDUC. 245, 252–55 (2007); Deborah Gordon Klehr, Addressing the Unintended Consequences of No Child
Left Behind and Zero Tolerance: Better Strategies for Safe Schools and Successful Students, 16 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 585, 602–03 (2009); Nance, supra note 21, at 397; James E. Ryan, The Perverse
Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 969–70 (2004). Under the Federal GunFree Schools Act, states receiving federal education funds must have a state law that requires schools to expel
students for at least one year for bringing a firearm to school. See 20 U.S.C. § 7151(b)(1). Although the
NCLBA reenacted a softened version of this law by permitting superintendents to modify the expulsion
requirement on a case-by-case basis, see id.; see also Federal Law on Guns in Schools, L. CENTER TO PREVENT
GUN VIOLENCE (May 21, 2012), http://smartgunlaws.org/federal-law-on-guns-in-schools/, many states and
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scholar Jim Ryan noted, “the temptation to exclude low-performing students,
enhanced by the NCLBA, can hardly be denied: One less student performing
below the proficiency level increases the overall percentage of students who
have hit that benchmark.”82 Indeed, this observation is bolstered by the fact
that the NCLBA does not have the same accountability standards for
graduation rates as it does for testing.83 For schools that adopt this exclusionary
ethos, strict security measures play an integral role. When school officials
using intense surveillance methods discover low-performing students carrying
contraband, they may expel these students, transfer them to alternative
educational settings, or refer them to law enforcement officials to avoid having
to count their low test scores against the school’s overall pass rate.
II. EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AGAINST STRICT
SECURITY MEASURES
In the aftermath of Newtown, policymakers, educators, and, of course,
parents want nothing more than to keep children safe. Not only must school
officials protect students from dangerous intruders, they also must address
safety and discipline issues from their own students.84 Although few would
argue that using strict security measures in schools is ideal, many will respond
that the safety of our children in schools is paramount, which overrides any
pedagogical concerns their use creates.
The safety of children in schools is extremely important. No one can
plausibly argue otherwise. But a difficult truth that all must accept is that those
determined to commit violent acts inside schools will succeed.85 Indeed, the
Columbine High School shootings occurred in the presence of armed guards

schools adopted laws and policies modeled after the original Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994 by creating strict
rules that impose predetermined consequences for certain acts, irrespective of the surrounding circumstances
or intent of the students. See Klehr, supra, at 589. These so-called zero tolerance policies have pushed more
students out of schools and have increased referrals to the juvenile justice system. Id. at 590.
82 Ryan, supra note 81, at 969.
83 Id. at 970.
84 See Timeline: School Violence in the U.S., CNN.COM (Dec. 14, 2012, 12:11 PM), http://www.cnn.
com/2012/12/14/us/timeline-school-violence/index.html (detailing the number of violent acts in schools
committed by students and outsiders).
85 Cf. Amanda Terkel, Columbine High School Had Armed Guard During Massacre in 1999,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 21, 2012, 11:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/21/columbine-armedguards_n_2347096.html (describing the Columbine High School shooting tragedy that occurred in the
presence of an armed security officer).
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and metal detectors.86 It is simply impossible to ensure the safety of all our
children at school at all times.87
Ironically, although highly publicized acts of school violence skew the
public’s perception of school safety,88 empirical evidence demonstrates that
schools remain among the safest places for children.89 For example, during the
2008–2009 school year, there were a total of 1,579 homicides of youth ages
five to eighteen, but only seventeen of those homicides occurred at school.90
Likewise, in 2008, four in one thousand students ages twelve to eighteen were
victims of serious violent crimes such as rape or assault at school, but eight in
one thousand students of the same age group were victims of those crimes
away from school.91 Of course, some schools face serious safety and discipline
86 See id. (noting presence of armed guards); Marcus Wright, Experts Say Intrusive Security at Public
Schools Reproduces Social Inequality, MICH. CITIZEN (Nov. 15, 2012), http://michigancitizen.com/dps-eaatighten-security/ (noting presence of metal detectors).
87 See Arne Duncan, Resources for Schools to Prepare for and Recover from Crisis, HOMEROOM (Dec.
17, 2012), http://www.ed.gov/blog/2012/12/resources-for-schools-to-prepare-for-and-recover-from-crisis/
(explaining that not all tragedies in schools can be prevented).
88 See, e.g., Monahan & Torres, supra note 79, at 2–3 (explaining that although schools continue to be
the safest places for children, the threat of another school shooting haunts the social imagery); Matthew J.
Mayer & Peter E. Leone, School Violence and Disruption Revisited: Equity and Safety in the School House, 40
FOCUS ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. Sept. 2007, at 1, 6 (“[M]edia coverage of school violence has shaped the
public’s beliefs, and in many cases has led to a distorted perception of violence in schools, as well as
adolescent violence more generally.” (citations omitted)); Randy Borum et al., What Can Be Done About
School Shootings? A Review of the Evidence, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 27, 27 (2010) (“[S]chool shootings
receive such intense publicity, and are such inherently disturbing events, that they generate an inflated
perception of danger.” (citation omitted)).
89 See Duncan, supra note 87 (“Schools are among the safest places for children and adolescents in our
country, and, in fact, crime in schools has been trending downward for more than a decade.”); see also
BARBARA FEDDERS, JASON LANGBERG & JENNIFER STORY, SCHOOL SAFETY IN NORTH CAROLINA: REALITIES,
RECOMMENDATIONS & RESOURCES 4 (May 2013), available at http://www.legalaidnc.org/public/learn/media_
releases/2013_MediaReleases/school-safety-in-north-carolina.pdf (“School violence that results in death is
extremely rare. Young people are much more likely to be harmed in the home or on the streets than they are in
schools.” (footnote omitted)); Randall R. Beger, The “Worst of Both Worlds”: School Security and the
Disappearing Fourth Amendment Rights of Students, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 336, 338 (2003) (“Contrary to
popular belief, schools remain among the safest places for children.”); Borum et al., supra note 88, at 27
(explaining that the number of homicides that occur on school grounds represents less than one percent of the
annual homicides of children ages five to eighteen, and that “any given school can expect to experience a
student homicide about once every 6,000 years”); Pedro A. Noguera, Schools, Prisons, and Social Implications
of Punishment: Rethinking Disciplinary Practices, 42 THEORY INTO PRAC. 341, 343 (2003) (“Despite surveys
that suggest a growing number of teachers and students fear violence in school, schools in the United States
are generally safe places.” (citation omitted)).
90 See SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2011, at iv (2012), available
at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012002rev.pdf.
91 See SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2010, at iv (2010). But see
id. (“In 2008, students ages 12 to 18 were victims of about 1.2 million nonfatal crimes (theft plus violent
crime) at school, compared to about 1 million nonfatal crimes away from school.” (footnotes omitted)).
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issues that must be addressed. But before school officials and policymakers
decide to make significant financial investments in strict security measures,
they should examine the educational and sociological considerations against
using strict security measures and consider alternative methods that reduce
violence more effectively and do not harm the learning environment.
A. Strict Security Measures Are Not Aligned with Students’ Best Interests
When student Minerva Dickson saw her high school for the first time in
Brooklyn, New York, it reminded her of a prison.92 Every day before entering
school, she would wait in a long line as each student went through various
security checks.93 First, she would swipe an identification card through a
machine.94 Once cleared, she would head to the metal detectors that were
monitored by several police officers.95 While the police officers watched,
Minerva would remove her jewelry, hairpins, and shoes, then place her
personal bags on a conveyer belt to be scanned.96 Next, an officer would run a
security wand as she stood with her arms out and legs spread.97 Minerva would
then collect her things, put her shoes on, and hurry to her first class.98 When
asked how she felt about the security process, she responded, “They treat[] us
like criminals. It ma[kes] me hate school. When you cage up students like that
it doesn’t make us safe, it makes things worse.”99
In another example, in September 2012, Bushwick Community High
School, a transfer high school for troubled teenagers, installed metal detectors
for the first time.100 Because the junior high school with which Bushwick
shares its building developed a reputation for violence, city education officials
determined that all students in the building should walk through metal
detectors every day.101 This security measure had a profound effect on many
Bushwick students. One student said that the first time she saw those machines
92 Daryl Khan, Perps or Pupils? Safety Policy Creates Friction in New York City Schools, CENTER FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 21, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/09/21/10950/perps-or-pupilssafety-policy-creates-friction-new-york-city-schools.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Michael Powell, In a School Built on Trust, Metal Detectors Inject Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/nyregion/in-a-brooklyn-school-metal-detectors-inject-fear.html.
101 Id.
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she felt sick and wanted to run.102 When the security guard told her that she
would feel different about the detectors after another student injured her with a
weapon, she replied, “Really? When I came here last year, I remember feeling
one thing: This is family, and that makes me feel safe.”103 Another student
remarked that the detectors “add[ed] to [his] stress and isolation.”104 The
longtime dean and teacher maintained that “[t]he glue in this building is love,
and the metal trespasses on that.”105 Michael Powell, the author of the article,
aptly observed:
Any school that works has an ethos, a culture and a language known
to these particular students and these particular teachers. Here, on
Palmetto Street in a very nonhipster corner of Bushwick, that ethos is
scouring honesty and trust. You cannot pull one over; you will be
106
challenged, but you will not be discarded.

The new security measures, however, threatened that ethos.
Educators have long understood that trust is a vital component to
establishing a healthy climate conducive to learning.107 Indeed, students learn
best when they feel respected, have positive attitudes toward their classmates
and their teachers, and feel good about themselves.108 Strict security measures,
however, undermine the climate of trust needed to effectively educate children.
Their use sends a negative message that students are harmful, dangerous, and
prone to commit illegal, violent acts.109 That message “sour[s] students’

102

Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
104 Id.
105 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
106 Id.
107 See David Domenici & James Forman Jr., What It Takes to Transform a School Inside a Juvenile
Justice Facility: The Story of the Maya Angelou Academy, in JUSTICE FOR KIDS: KEEPING KIDS OUT OF THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 283, 289 (“High-achieving schools are places where a culture of
trust dominates.”); Roger D. Goddard, Megan Tschannen-Moran & Wayne K. Hoy, A Multilevel Examination
of the Distribution and Effects of Teacher Trust in Students and Parents in Urban Elementary Schools, 102
ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 3, 3 (2001) (explaining that trusting in others is an important element of the learning
process); Megan Tschannen-Moran & Wayne K. Hoy, A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Nature, Meaning,
and Measurement of Trust, 70 REV. EDUC. RES. 547, 547 (2000) (explaining that trusting in others is an
important element of the learning process).
108 See Donna Lieberman, Over-Policing in Schools on Students’ Education and Privacy Rights, NYCLU,
http://www.nyclu.org/content/over-policing-schools-students-education-and-privacy-rights (last visited Aug.
12, 2013).
109 See Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an Individualized
Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the Schools, 22 GA. L. REV. 897, 943 (1988).
103
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attitudes toward school and school authorities and undermine[s] a positive,
respectful academic environment.”110
According to scholar Paul Hirschfield, strict security measures produce
barriers between students and their schools and are “a frequent cause of
disunity or discord within the school community.”111 Scholar Martin Gardner
explained it this way: “In a very real sense, each and every student stands
accused, has become a ‘suspect,’ in generalized school searches, especially
given the special relationship of trust which supposedly exists between student
and teacher.”112 Searches taking place in schools are much different than
searches in other environments such as airports.113 As Gardner reasons,
Surely a student even indirectly accused by his teacher as a
possible thief or drug user suffers a greater indignity and loss of
self-esteem by being subjected to a generalized search than does
an airline passenger passing through a metal detector or a driver
[through] a checkpoint. Far from “morally neutral,” school
searches are instead particularly rife with moral overtones.114
Further, airline passengers voluntarily decide to subject themselves to being
searched. Students, on the other hand, are subject to mandatory school
attendance laws and must submit to these searches against their will.
After interviewing students subjected to such security measures, scholar
Jen Weiss reported that strict security measures caused students to “feel
consistently watched, to distrust, hide from, and avoid authority figures.”115
She found that instead of promoting a greater sense of safety and civic-minded
school community, students felt a sense of danger and disillusion.116 She
concluded that students in schools using strict security measures “experience
firsthand what it is to be monitored, contained, and harassed, all in the name of
safety and protection.”117 Similarly, Donna Liebermann, Executive Director of
the New York Civil Liberties Union, testified that strict security measures
110 Paul Hirschfield, School Surveillance in America: Disparate and Unequal, in SCHOOLS UNDER
SURVEILLANCE: CULTURES OF CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 79, at 38, 46.
111 Id.
112 Gardner, supra note 109, at 943.
113 Id.
114 Id. (footnotes omitted).
115 Jen Weiss, Scan This: Examining Student Resistance to School Surveillance, in SCHOOLS UNDER
SURVEILLANCE: CULTURES OF CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 79, at 213, 227.
116 Id. at 213–14.
117 Id. at 213.
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produce environments that are not conducive to educational and social
growth.118 Instead, strict security measures “foster environments where
children perceive that they are being treated as criminals; where they are
diminished by such perceptions; and where they, consequently, cultivate
negative attitudes toward their schools.”119 One teacher put it this way: “The
medium is the message. And the message that [strict security measures] give[]
out is that we are afraid of our students.”120
Notably, while strict security measures negatively affect the learning
environment, several studies call into doubt whether these measures reduce
school violence at all.121 In fact, many argue that implementing strict security
118

See Lieberman, supra note 108.
Id.
120 Carol Ascher, Gaining Control of Violence in the Schools: A View from the Field, ERIC DIGEST, Sept.
1994, at 1, 4 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED377256.
pdf (“Rather than offering reassurance, metal detectors and other mechanical devices, as well as security
forces, are seen as providing a false sense of safety, if not a harsh symbol of the failure to create safe
schools.”).
121 See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 8
(2005), available at http://www.advancementproject.org/sites/default/files/publications/FINALEOLrep.pdf
(explaining that while strict security measures “produce a perception of safety, there is little or no evidence
that they create safer learning environments or change disruptive behaviors”); John Blosnich & Robert
Bossarte, Low-Level Violence in Schools: Is There an Association Between School Safety Measures and Peer
Victimization?, 81 J. SCH. HEALTH 107, 107 (2011) (concluding that school security measures did not reduce
violent behaviors related to bullying); Abigail Hankin, Marci Hertz & Thomas Simon, Impacts of Metal
Detector Use in Schools: Insights from 15 Years of Research, 81 J. SCH. HEALTH 100, 105 (2011) (concluding
that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate whether metal detectors reduce school violence); Matthew J.
Mayer & Peter E. Leone, A Structural Analysis of School Violence and Disruption: Implications for Creating
Safer Schools, 22 EDUC. & TREATMENT CHILD. 333, 350, 352 (1999) (finding that student disorder and
victimization were higher in schools using strict security measures than in schools that did not use such
measures); Richard E. Redding & Sarah M. Shalf, The Legal Context of School Violence: The Effectiveness of
Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Efforts to Reduce Gun Violence in Schools, 23 LAW & POL’Y 297,
319 (2001) (“It is hard to find anything better than anecdotal evidence” to demonstrate that strict security
measures such as metal detectors and guards reduce violence in schools). But see Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, Violence-Related Attitudes and Behaviors of High School Students—New York City, 1992, 42
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 773 (1993), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/00022011.htm (showing that students who attended schools using metal detectors were less likely
to carry a weapon inside a school (7.8% versus 13.6%), but the presence of metal detectors did not reduce
overall school violence); Renee Wilson-Brewer & Howard Spivak, Violence Prevention in Schools and Other
Community Settings: The Pediatrician as Initiator, Educator, Collaborator, and Advocate, 94 PEDIATRICS 623,
626–27 (1994) (stating that one school system in New York City reported that after the school security staff
began using hand-held metal detectors to conduct unannounced lobby searches of students at the beginning of
the school day, weapon-related incidents decreased in thirteen of fifteen schools); Rachana Bhatt & Tomeka
Davis, The Impact of Random Metal Detector Searches on School Violence, Contraband Possession, and
Perceptions of Safety 22–23 (Dec. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www2.gsu.edu/~ecorrb/
index_files/RandomSearch.pdf (finding that, when comparing two geographically adjacent school districts in
Florida, the school district that used random metal detector searches reduced the probability of a student
119
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measures increases student behavioral problems and crime by alienating
students.122 For example, after conducting an empirical study involving almost
7,000 students, scholars Matthew Mayer and Peter Leone concluded that
schools’ reliance on metal detectors, locked doors, locker checks, and security
guards may lead to more disorder, crime, and violence in schools.123 They
observed:
Overall, the model may suggest that less attention should be paid to
running schools in an overly restrictive manner and rather, schools
should concentrate more on communicating individual responsibility
to students. Viewed in the context of a reciprocal relationship, the
data may suggest that disorder and restrictive management of the
school premises may go hand in hand and may feed off of each
124
other.

A description of one high school in the Chicago Public Schools that relies on
strict security measures is illustrative. Scholars Matthew Steinberg, Elaine
Allensworth, and David Johnson, with the cooperation of the Consortium on
Chicago School Research at the University of Chicago Urban Education
Institute, conducted an in-depth study of school safety in the Chicago Public
Schools and observed the following:
Inside Lake Erie, the physical environment is dominated by crowdcontrol mechanisms: metal detectors, which are present throughout
CPS high schools, greet students upon entering; folding tables corral
students at the main entrance and at informal security “checkpoints”

bringing a weapon to school). Research on the effectiveness of school security measures is extremely limited,
especially causal research demonstrating the effects of strict security measures. See Mayer & Leone, supra
note 88, at 12.
122 See Ascher, supra note 120, at 5 (maintaining that strict security measures “increase, rather than
alleviate, tension in schools”); Beger, supra note 89, at 340 (citing several studies demonstrating that
“aggressive security measures produce alienation and mistrust among students”); Michael Easterbrook, Taking
Aim at Violence, 32 PSYCHOL. TODAY, July–Aug. 2009 at 52, 56 (providing evidence that strict security
measures alienate students); Clifford H. Edwards, Student Violence and the Moral Dimensions of Education,
38 PSYCHOL. SCHS. 249, 250 (2001) (arguing that “intrusive strategies are likely to undermine the trust needed
to build cooperative school communities capable of really preventing violence”); Mayer & Leone, supra note
121, at 350, 352 (finding that student disorder and victimization were higher in schools using strict security
measures than in schools that did not use such measures); Pedro A. Noguera, Preventing and Producing
Violence: A Critical Analysis of Responses to School Violence, 65 HARV. EDUC. REV. 189, 190–91 (1995)
(arguing that a “get tough” approach does not create a safe environment because coercive measures create
mistrust and resistance among the student body); accord AARON KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY: SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE IN AN AGE OF FEAR 7, 15–18 (2010) (explaining that student misbehavior is likely to increase
rather than decrease when students perceive they are treated unfairly and with disrespect).
123 See Mayer & Leone, supra note 121, at 349.
124 Id. at 351.
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throughout hallways; folding metal gates are pulled across entrances
to stairwells and padlocked. There is a constant police presence
125
outside and inside the school.

Yet, despite all of these strict security measures, substantial violence and
disorder abounded in that school. Steinberg, Allensworth, and Johnson
continue:
Nearly all teachers at Lake Erie report problems with robbery in the
building, gang activity, fights, disorder, and disrespect, and threequarters of teachers report that students threaten them with violence.
Interactions between students and teachers are frequently hostile and
mutually disrespectful; students’ and teachers’ frustration with one
another are easily visible. An algebra teacher at Lake Erie complains
that constant disruption “impedes the teaching process”; repeated
conflicts make it difficult, he continues, for teachers “to reach
students who want to learn as deeply as you know [they] could.”
Another teacher observes, “I see behavior problems I have never seen
before . . . I get cursed out almost daily.” . . . Violence inside and
outside the school creates a climate of mistrust, antagonism, and
126
fear.

Rather than relying on strict security measures and punitive discipline
approaches to reduce school violence, the study concludes that schools “must
make stronger efforts to foster trusting, collaborative relationships with
students and their parents.”127
Further, one must not overlook that strict security measures cannot
completely prevent even serious acts of violence from occurring at school. For
example, in 2004, a student in a Washington, D.C., high school was shot by
another student inside the school.128 The school had metal detectors, perimeter
fencing, and guards.129 The infamous Columbine massacre occurred in a
school that used metal detectors and had armed guards.130 According to Ronald
125 MATTHEW P. STEINBERG, ELAINE ALLENSWORTH & DAVID W. JOHNSON, STUDENT AND TEACHER
SAFETY IN CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE ROLES OF COMMUNITY CONTEXT AND SCHOOL SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION 15 (2011) (emphasis removed), available at http://ccsr.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/
publications/SAFETY%20IN%20CPS.pdf.
126 Id. (emphasis removed).
127 Id. at 2.
128 See Sara Neufeld & Sumathi Reddy, Violent Week Renews Metal Detector Debate, BALT. SUN, Oct.
14, 2006, at 1A, available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2006-10-14/news/0610140131_1_metaldetectors-school-students-park-elementary-school.
129 Id.
130 See Wright, supra note 86.
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Stephens, an executive director of the National School Safety Center, “[R]ulefollowers will follow the rules. Rule-breakers will break the rules. . . .
Sometimes the metal scanning is more of a comfort.”131 Scholar Pedro
Noguera maintains that most students he spoke with during his visits to urban
schools understood that anyone who wanted to bring a weapon into a school
could get it into the building without being discovered by a metal detector.132
Scholar Crystal Garcia reports that only thirty-two percent of the school safety
administrators she surveyed believed that metal detectors effectively prevented
violent crime in their schools.133
But more importantly, even if strict security measures deter some students
from bringing dangerous weapons to schools, these measures do not support
long-term solutions needed to effectively prevent school and community
violence. Lasting solutions include helping children develop socially
responsible behavior, build social and emotional stability, understand
collective responsibility, and resolve conflict peacefully.134 Unfortunately,
strict security measures exacerbate underlying problems by forging barriers of
adversity and mistrust between students and educators.135 Furthermore,
investing millions of dollars in security equipment and law enforcement
officers diverts scarce resources away from other educational and mental
health services that students desperately need.136

131

Neufeld & Reddy, supra note 128 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Noguera, supra note 122, at 193; see also Ascher, supra note 120, at 5 (“[T]hose few students intent
on bringing in weapons are inevitably a step ahead of the security devices, which means that enforcement
activities alone cannot create a safe school.”); Neufeld & Reddy, supra note 128 (explaining that students
interviewed in focus groups maintained that it was “easy to get around” metal detectors).
133 See Crystal A. Garcia, School Safety Technology in America: Current Use and Perceived
Effectiveness, 14 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 30, 40 (2003).
134 See infra Part IV.B.
135 See supra notes 121–22.
136 See, e.g., Hankin, Hertz, & Simon, supra note 121, at 101 (“The Cleveland public school system
estimated a cost of $3.7 million to incorporate walk-through metal detectors and X-ray scanners in each of 111
public schools.”); id. at 105 (“Metal detector programs are expensive, and funds spent on metal detectors
would not be available for other programs and strategies that have been shown to be effective at reducing
youth risk for violence and promoting pro-social behaviors.”); Dakarai I. Aarons, Mayor Herenton Vows to
Add More Officers, Detectors to City’s Public Middle and High Schools, COM. APPEAL (Feb. 13, 2008, 10:48
AM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2008/feb/13/board-member-says-memphis-city-schools-should-be-s/
(explaining that a “feasibility study conducted by school administrators said it would cost the 115,000-student
school district $4.5 million in equipment and staffing to conduct metal-detector screenings daily in middle and
high schools”).
132
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B. Strict Security Measures Applied Disproportionately to Minority Students
Are Particularly Harmful
That schools serving primarily minority students are more inclined to rely
on strict security measures is particularly harmful for several reasons. First,
social scientists and criminologists maintain that the presence of strict security
in schools with high minority populations perpetuates racial inequalities.137
Loïc Wacquant argues that inner-city schools located in impoverished
communities have “deteriorated to the point where they operate in the manner
of institutions of confinement whose primary mission is not to educate but to
ensure ‘custody and control.’”138 He maintains:
[T]he carceral atmosphere of schools and the constant presence of
armed guards in uniform in the lobbies, corridors, cafeteria, and
playground of their establishment habituates the children of the
hyperghetto to the demeanor, tactics, and interactive style of the
correctional officers many of them are bound to encounter shortly
139
after their school days are over.

Lamentably, schools that focus primarily on custody and control of students
deprive their students of quality educational experiences that affluent white
students typically enjoy.140 Such inferior educational experiences may inhibit
minority students’ future educational and employment opportunities, further
exacerbating social inequalities.141
Second, strict security measures in schools skew minority students’
perceptions of government institutions and condition them to accept intense
surveillance by government authorities.142 Henry Leonardatos, an experienced
school administrator, observes that subjecting students to pat-downs, metal

137

See Aaron Kupchik & Geoff K. Ward, Reproducing Social Inequality Through School Security:
Effects of Race and Class on School Security Measures 3–10 (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.edweek.org/media/kupchikward-02security.pdf.
138 Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y
95, 108 (2001).
139 Id.
140 See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 137, at 7 (“Marginalized youth are presumed to be young criminals
and treated as such through exposure to criminal justice oriented practices (e.g., police surveillance and metal
detectors), while youth with social, political and cultural capital are presumed to be well-behaved, treated as
such, and empowered to be productive citizens.”).
141 See Hirschfield, supra note 110, at 40 (arguing that the disproportionate use of strict security measures
prepares urban minority students for certain positions in the post-industrial order, such as those of prisoners,
soldiers, or service sector workers).
142 Kupchik & Ward, supra note 137, at 6–7.
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detectors, and other strict security measures “ends up teaching students to not
think for themselves.”143 He continues:
They play the role that is expected of them—they will play the role of
the criminal and victimizer because the cops will say, ‘don’t do this
and don’t [do] that.’ When you do that to a kid you’re telling the kid
that this is how the world is supposed to be. You end up putting the
144
idea in the kid’s head that this is what he’s supposed to be doing.

According to Leonardatos, students in poor, minority communities are
routinely stopped and frisked in their neighborhoods, then find they are treated
the same way in their schools.145 The result is that these students perceive their
school as simply “another appendage to the police state.”146
Third, the trust needed to establish a healthy climate conducive to learning
is undermined when minority students are cognizant that strict security
measures are applied disproportionately.147 For example, when Minerva
Dickson, a student who was subject to intense conditions at school,148
discovered during a conference that other students were not subject to these
conditions, it “blew her mind.”149 She said, “I thought all schools were like
mine . . . . I couldn’t believe a student could just walk into their school without
dealing with all that.”150 Indeed, the disproportionate use of strict security

143

Khan, supra note 92.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 Id.; accord VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS, at xiv,
133–38 (2011) (finding that low-income youth and young men of color disproportionately experience
surveillance, and that there is a “system in which schools, police, probation officers, families, community
centers, the media, businesses, and other institutions systematically treat young people’s everyday behaviors as
criminal activity”).
146 Khan, supra note 92.
147 See Glennon, supra note 10, at 112 (arguing that schools cannot promote a positive school climate for
learning when students are aware of the disparate application of discipline along racial lines).
148 See Khan¸ supra note 92.
149 Id.
150 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Paul Hirschfield’s interview of a former inner-city student also
illustrates the sense of unfairness that students perceive at schools that rely on strict security measures. This
student explained:
144

That school was run more like a prison than a high school. It don’t have to be nothing illegal
about it. But you’re getting arrested. No regard for if a college going to accept you with this
record. No regard for none of that, because you’re not expected to leave this school and go to
college. You’re not expected to do anything.
Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison?: The Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA,
12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79, 79 (2008).
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measures on minorities may exacerbate the distrust that many minority
students already have toward educators.151
Finally, disproportionate exposure to strict security measures perpetuates
inequalities by affecting minority students’ opportunities for advancement.
Strict security measures, especially when used in conjunction with zerotolerance policies, increase the likelihood of suspension, expulsion, and
arrest—all of which can have profound consequences on students’ future
educational and employment opportunities.152
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE REVEALS DISPARITIES IN THE USE OF STRICT
SECURITY MEASURES
The use of strict security measures in schools certainly is not new. After
other highly publicized shootings in schools, there were heavy demands to
tighten school security and substantial government funding provided to schools
for strict security measures.153 Yet, what types of schools implemented those
measures and to what degree is not clear. Further, while a few empirical
151 See Constance Flanagan et al., School and Community Climates and Civic Commitments: Patterns for
Ethnic Minority and Majority Students, 99 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 421, 423 (2007) (stating that studies have
shown that minority groups have reported “a lower sense of school belonging than . . . their European
American peers”); Rosa Hernández Sheets, Urban Classroom Conflict: Student–Teacher Perception: Ethnic
Integrity, Solidarity, and Resistance, 28 URB. REV. 165, 175–76 (1996) (reporting in a study on classroom
conflict that minority students believed that teachers did not respect them or care about them, that teachers
abused their authority, that they were purposely pushed to the edge and were expected and encouraged to be
hostile, and that teachers expected and wanted them to act out to justify disciplinary actions); Susan Rakosi
Rosenbloom & Niobe Way, Experiences of Discrimination Among African American, Asian American, and
Latino Adolescents in an Urban High School, 35 YOUTH & SOC’Y 420, 434 (2004) (reporting that “[w]hen
African American and Latino students were asked about their experiences with discrimination, they described
hostile relationships with adults in positions of authority such as . . . teachers in school”); cf. Noguera, supra
note 122, at 201 (describing the sentiment in many black communities that black children are being treated
unfairly in schools).
152 Khan¸ supra note 92. Many are concerned that post-Newtown legislation that could provide more
funds for school security measures will exacerbate the school-to-prison pipeline. See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, How
Obama Might Make the School-to-Prison Pipeline Worse, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 18, 2013), http://prospect.org/
article/how-obama-might-make-school-prison-pipeline-worse; Julianne Hing, After Newtown, School
Communities Brace for Another Influx of Police, COLORLINES (Jan. 10, 2013), http://colorlines.com/archives/
2013/01/militarized_post-newtown-schools.html; Simon McCormack, Gun Control Legislation Must Not
Include More Cops in Schools: ACLU Letter to Biden, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/14/gun-control-legislation_n_2474188.html.
153 See, e.g., David Firestone, After Shootings, Nation’s Schools Add to Security, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
1999, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/13/us/after-shootings-nation-s-schools-add-tosecurity.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; John D. Sutter, Columbine Massacre Changed School Security,
CNN.COM (Apr. 20, 2009, 9:30 AM), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-04-20/living/columbine.school.safety_1_
metal-detectors-and-security-national-school-safety-school-security?_s=PM:LIVING.
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studies measure the general use of strict security measures in schools,154 there
are no national, empirical studies that evaluate the types of schools that apply
combinations of strict security measures creating an intense environment that
may not be conducive to a healthy learning climate. This study seeks to fill that
gap.
I empirically tested the hypothesis that low-income students and minority
students are subjected to intense surveillance methods more often than other
students, even after taking into account factors such as school crime,
neighborhood crime, school disorder, school location, and school size. To test
this hypothesis, I analyzed restricted data from the U.S. Department of
Education’s 2009–2010 School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS). The
SSOCS is a rich, national dataset that contains information submitted by
school principals regarding school crime, security practices, disorder,
demographics, and other related information.155
My study builds on Aaron Kupchik and Geoff Ward’s work based on
SSOCS data from the 2005–2006 school year.156 In that study, Kupchik and
Ward found that, after controlling for several other factors that might influence
the use of school security measures, student race was a strong predictor for the
presence of metal detectors.157 Kupchik and Ward also found that student
poverty was a predictor for having law enforcement officers in middle and
elementary schools, locked gates in elementary schools, and metal detectors in
middle schools.158 In addition, they found that surveillance cameras were
ubiquitous across all social strata at all schools levels, and that race was not a
predictor for using law enforcement officers or locked gates.159
This study builds on Kupchik and Ward’s work by using many of the same
independent variables that they used to control for other factors that might
influence the use of strict security measures. However, this study differs from
Kupchik and Ward’s study in two critical respects. First, this study used the
SSOCS data from the 2009–2010 school year, the most recent SSOCS data
154 See, e.g., JULIE KIERNAN COON, SECURITY TECHNOLOGY IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2007); Kupchik &
Ward, supra note 137.
155 See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY PRINCIPAL
QUESTIONNAIRE: 2009–10 SCHOOL YEAR 5 (2010) [hereinafter 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE], available
at http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ssocs/pdf/SSOCS_2010_Questionnaire.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2013).
156 See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 137, at 14.
157 Id. at 2.
158 Id.
159 Id. In fact, the percentage of racial/ethnic minority students was actually a negative predictor for use of
drug-sniffing dogs in high schools. Id. at 42.
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available, whereas Kupchik and Ward’s study examined data from the 2005–
2006 school year.160 Second, and of particular importance, this study sought to
uncover the characteristics of schools that employ a combination of strict
security measures that could create an intense environment that may not be
conducive to a healthy learning environment. Specifically, it sought to identify
whether race and poverty were strong predictors for schools using a
combination of metal detectors, law enforcement officers, surveillance
cameras, locked gates, and random sweeps for contraband. In contrast,
Kupchik and Ward’s study examined schools using only one of these
practices.161
First, I describe the 2009–2010 SSOCS dataset I used for this empirical
analysis. Next, I describe the variables I employed. Finally, I report the results
of the study.
A. Data and Sample
Data for this study came from the School Survey on Crime and Safety for
the 2009–2010 school year, published by the U.S. Department of Education’s
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).162 The dataset is the
restricted-access version, meaning it contains detailed, sensitive data, such as
information pertaining to the number of violent incidents that occurred at a
school during the school year.163 The restricted dataset became available in
June 2011 to researchers who met specified conditions.164 It is the most recent
data available on school safety from NCES.

160

Id. at 14.
See id. at 41–42.
162 See 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 155.
163 See Statistical Standard Program: Getting Started, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/
statprog/instruct_gettingstarted.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2013). The restricted-use data “have a higher level of
detail in the data compared to public-use data files.” Id. Although the restricted-use datasets are not available
to the general public, datasets that contain less sensitive data for prior school years are currently available. Id.
Those datasets can be downloaded at http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ssocs/data_products.asp.
164 NCES provides restricted-use datasets to certain researchers in qualified organizations. Id.
161

To qualify, an organization must provide a justification for access to the restricted-use data,
submit the required legal documents, agree to keep the data safe from unauthorized disclosures at
all times, and to participate fully in unannounced, unscheduled inspections of the researcher’s
office to ensure compliance with the terms of the License and the Security Plan form.
Id.; see also Statistical Standards Program: Applying for a Restricted-Use Data License, NAT’L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/statprog/instruct_apply.asp?type=rl (last visited Aug. 12, 2013) (providing
guidelines for applying to receive restricted-use datasets).
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NCES used the 2007–2008 school year Common Core of Data Public
Elementary/Secondary School Universe File (CCD),165 the most complete list
of public schools available, as a sampling frame166 to select schools to
participate in the study.167 After the sample frame was subdivided to ensure
that subgroups of interest would be adequately represented,168 3,480 schools
were randomly selected to participate in the study.169 A total of 2,650 public
schools (approximately seventy-six percent of the selected sample) submitted
usable questionnaires.170 NCES collected the data from February 24 to June 11,
2010.171
B. Dependent Variables
The 2009–2010 SSOCS restricted-use dataset provides a unique
opportunity to view, as a cross section and on a national scale, the types of
strict security measures that schools employ. In the 2009–2010 SSOCS, school
principals were asked to respond to several questions relating to school
165

The Common Core of Data “is an NCES annual census system that collects fiscal and nonfiscal data
on all public schools, public school districts, and state education agencies in the United States.” NAT’L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATS., 2009–2010 SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY (SSOCS): RESTRICTED-USE DATA
FILE USER MANUAL 8 (2011) [hereinafter 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL] (on file with author); see
also Helen M. Marks & Jason P. Nance, Contexts of Accountability Under Systemic Reform: Implications for
Principal Influence on Instruction and Supervision, 43 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 3, 10–11 (2007) (describing the
Common Core of Data). The CCD includes regular schools, charter schools, and schools that have magnet
programs in the United States. It excludes schools in the U.S. territories and outlying areas, such as American
Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico,
as well as overseas Department of Defense schools, newly closed schools, home schools, Bureau of Indian
Education schools, nonregular schools, ungraded schools, and schools with a high grade of kindergarten or
lower. 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra at 8.
166 A “sampling frame” is a list of units that could be selected for study. See RICHARD L. SCHEAFFER ET
AL., ELEMENTARY SURVEY SAMPLING 43 (5th ed. 1996).
167 See 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 165, at 8.
168 See id. at 9. The sample was stratified by instructional level (e.g., elementary school, middle school,
high school), locale (e.g., rural, suburb, urban), enrollment size, and region (e.g., Northeast, Midwest, South,
and West). In addition, the sample frame was stratified by percent of combined student population as
black/African-American, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, native Hawaiian/other Pacific Islander, or American
Indian/Alaska native. Id.
169 Id. at 10.
170 Id. at 1, 9–13. A response rate of seventy-six percent is very good and reduces bias in the data. EARL
BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 256 (9th ed. 2001). NCES notes that some schools were more
likely than others to respond to the survey. For example, schools more likely to respond included rural schools,
schools with fewer students, combined schools, or those with a low percentage of combined black/AfricanAmerican, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, native Hawaiian/other Pacific Islander, and American Indian/Alaska native
students. 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 165, at 9–10. While no category had a response
rate lower than sixty-nine percent, see id. at 13, using a sample weight to analyze the data helped ameliorate
the effects of the discrepancies in the response rates. See infra note 215.
171 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 165, at 1.

NANCE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

9/24/2013 12:07 PM

STUDENTS, SECURITY, AND RACE

31

security.172 For example, principals were asked if, during the 2009–2010
school year, it was a practice in the principal’s school to
• require students to pass through metal detectors each day;
• perform one or more random metal detector checks on students;
• perform one or more random sweeps for contraband (e.g., drugs or
weapons), but not including dog sniffs;
• control access to school grounds during school hours (e.g., locked or
monitored gates);
• use one or more security cameras to monitor the school; and
• have any security guards, security personnel, or sworn law enforcement
officers present at [the principal’s school] at least once a week.173
Principals responded with a “yes” or “no” to each one of these questions.174
The dependent variables for my study represented the likelihood that a
school principal responded affirmatively to using various combinations of
strict security practices. For example, the dependent variables measured the
likelihood that a school used metal detectors on students, either by requiring
students to pass through metal detectors every day, or by performing one or
more random metal detector checks on students (metal detectors); had a
security or law enforcement officer on campus (guards); conducted random
sweeps for contraband (random sweeps); used security cameras (security
cameras); and controlled access to school grounds by locking or monitoring the
gates (locked gates).
I examined four different combinations of the strict security practices
described above. I began with a core condition that can create an intense
environment that may not be conducive to a healthy learning climate, which
includes using metal detectors and having a guard or law enforcement officer
present at school.175 I subsequently added additional measures that intensify
the surveillance environment. The resulting four combinations are as follows:
(a) metal detectors and guards; (b) metal detectors, guards, and random
sweeps; (c) metal detectors, guards, random sweeps, and security cameras; and
(d) metal detectors, guards, random sweeps, security cameras, and locked
gates.

172
173
174
175

2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 155, at 5, 8.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.
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There is one significant limitation of using the SSOCS data to test this
study’s hypothesis. In two of the questions, the SSOCS asked principals
whether it was a practice of their school to perform random metal detector
checks or random sweeps for contraband “one or more” times during the
school year.176 Thus, it is possible that when a principal responded
affirmatively to one (or both) of these questions, the school had indeed
performed only one random metal detector check or one random sweep for
contraband during the school year. And, if a school performed only one
random metal detector check or only one random sweep for contraband during
the school year, perhaps that action had only a minimal effect on the learning
environment. On the other hand, if a school indicated that it was using several
of these criminal-justice-oriented security measures in conjunction, which is
what this study measured, then it would seem more likely that the school used
these security measures more than once during the school year, and quite
possibly used them regularly. Further, if a school made a significant
investment in metal detectors, it seems unlikely that it would use them only
one time during the school year.177
C. Independent Variables
To measure the effect of student race, I used the percentage of the schools’
student population that consisted of African-Americans, Hispanics,
Asian/Pacific Islanders, and American Indian/Alaska native students
(% minority).178 To measure student poverty levels, I used the percentage of
students who were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. Free and reducedprice lunch is a common proxy for student poverty (% poverty).179 In addition
176

2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 155, at 5.
Nevertheless, more precise questions that target how often schools perform these searches on students
should be included in future distributions of the SSOCS. Nance, supra note 21, at 429 (recommending that the
U.S. Department of Education reformulate many of the questions posed in the SSOCS).
178 See ROBERS ET AL., supra note 90, at 112. Racial data for the 2009–2010 SSOCS came from the 2007–
2008 CCD school data file. See 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 165, at 29. Although there
was a two-year difference, it is highly unlikely that a school would experience a major shift in student
population over a two-year period. A major racial shift in the student population for a school over a two-year
period would require an extraordinary event such as a desegregation court order.
179 See, e.g., Federal Education Budget Project, NEW AM. FOUND., http://febp.newamerica.net/
background-analysis/federal-school-nutrition-programs (last updated July 1, 2013) (“Researchers often use
free or reduced price lunch (FRPL) enrollment figures as a proxy for poverty at the school level, because
Census poverty data (which is used at the state and district level) is not available disaggregated below the
school district level and is not collected annually.”); Michael Heise, Litigated Learning, Law’s Limits, and
Urban School Reform Challenges, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1419, 1441 (2007) (using student eligibility for free and
reduced-price lunch as a proxy for student poverty).
177
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to race and poverty, I included other student demographics that are consistent
with student marginalization, such as the percentage of students enrolled in
special education (% special ed.) and the percentage of students who have
limited English proficiency (% LEP).180 I also included the percentage of
students who scored below the fifteenth percentile on standardized tests
(% low test score) because, as explained above, it is possible that the
accountability movement has motivated some schools to adopt strict security
measures.181 Each of these percentages was reported by school principals.182
School crime is another factor that might influence whether school officials
decide to implement strict security measures.183 The SSOCS asks school
officials to report the number of incidents of various types of school crime
during the school year.184 Because the severity of the school crimes may
influence whether schools implement tighter security measures,185 I
categorized the crimes according to their degree of severity. I included violent
incidents such as rape or attempted rape; sexual battery other than rape;
robbery with or without a weapon; physical attacks with or without a weapon
(violence);186 threats of physical attack with or without a weapon (threats);187
incidents involving possession of a firearm, explosive device, knife, or other
sharp object (weapons);188 incidents of distribution, possession or use of illegal
drugs, inappropriate prescription drugs, or alcohol (drugs);189 incidents of theft
of items over $10 (theft);190 and incidents of vandalism (vandalism).191
In addition, school disorder may influence a school’s decision to implement
tighter security measures.192 To account for school disorder, I created an index
based on responses to several questions posed to school officials in the
SSOCS. School officials were asked to rate on a scale of one to five the

180

See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 137, at 15.
See supra Part I.D.
182 See 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 155, at 16.
183 See Kelly Welch & Allison Ann Payne, Racial Threat and Punitive School Discipline, 57 SOC. PROBS.
25, 27 (2010) (“One factor presumed to be closely associated with school punitiveness and disciplinary
practice is the level of school crime and disorder.” (citation omitted)).
184 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 155, at 11.
185 Kupchik & Ward, supra note 137, at 17–18.
186 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 155, at 11.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 137, at 17; Welch & Payne, supra note 183, at 27.
181
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frequency of occurrences relating to student racial tensions, student bullying,
student sexual harassment of other students, student harassment of other
students based on sexual orientation or gender identity, disorder in the
classroom, student verbal abuse of teachers, student acts of disrespect for
teachers other than verbal abuse, student gang activities, and student cult or
extremist group activities.193 After I recoded the scale so that higher values
indicated greater frequency, I computed the mean value of the principals’
responses to these questions (school disorder).194
I also controlled for the principals’ perception of crime problems near the
school.195 School officials were asked to describe the crime level in the area
where their schools were located on a scale of one to three (high, moderate, or
low).196 I recoded those values so that higher values reflected higher
perceptions of crime (neighborhood crime).197
The involvement of external community groups in schools may also affect
the decision to implement strict security measures.198 Principals were asked if
various community and outside groups were involved in their efforts to
promote safe, disciplined, and drug-free schools.199 Those groups included
parent groups (parents), social services agencies (social services), juvenile
justice agencies (juvenile justice), law enforcement agencies (law
enforcement),
mental
health
agencies
(mental
health),
civic
organizations/service clubs (civic orgs.), private corporations/businesses
(business orgs.), and religious organizations (religious orgs.).200 I included a
dummy variable for each of these groups to indicate their participation.201
193 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 155, at 13. Principals indicated whether these types of
problems occurred (1) daily, (2) at least once a week, (3) at least once a month, (4) on occasion, or (5) never
happens. Id.
194 See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 137, at 17–18.
195 Id. at 18 (controlling for the administrators’ perceptions of the level of crime in the neighborhoods
around the schools).
196 “Controlling for” means measuring the effect of one variable while taking into account the effect of
another variable. See Will G. Hopkins, A New View of Statistics, SPORTSCIENCE, http://www.sportsci.org/
resource/stats/complex.html (last updated June 22, 2002). For example, researchers who wish to study the
effect of gender on weight would want to “control for” height because of the known effect height has on
weight. See id.
197 See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 137, at 18.
198 See id. at 16.
199 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 155, at 7.
200 Id.
201 Creating dummy variables is a way to include categorical predictor variables in estimation models
such as logistic regression. See Inst. for Digital Research & Educ., FAQ: What Is Dummy Coding?, UCLA.EDU,
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/dummy.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2013) (describing dummy coding).
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I also took into account the geographic region of the schools. Prior research
suggests that schools across every geographic region have intensified their
surveillance and disciplinary measures, but the South has historically
maintained a stronger disciplinary approach in schools.202 The SSOCS
database did not contain information regarding the individual states in which
each participating school is located. Rather, it only contained information
regarding in which geographical region each school resides (Northeast, South,
West, Midwest).203 I included dummy variables for the Northeast, West, and
Midwest to compare schools from these regions to schools in the South.
School urbanicity also may affect whether principals decide to employ
strict security measures.204 The SSOCS database categorized schools by
whether the school was located in a city, suburb, town, or rural area.205 I
created dummy variables for schools located in suburban areas (suburban),
towns (town), and rural areas (rural) to compare to schools located in cities.
Additionally, student population (student pop.) may influence the use of strict
security measures. Schools with larger student populations might be more
likely to implement security measures as a quick, efficient means to maintain
safety and discipline. I included each school’s total enrollment as reported by
school principals.206
I also included other control variables such as the building level and
whether the school was nontraditional. Regarding building level, as I only
examined secondary schools, I included dummy variables for middle schools
(middle) and combined schools (combined) to compare to high schools.207
Nontraditional schools (nontraditional) included whether the school was a
charter school or magnet school and was dummy-coded as a comparison
against traditional schools.208 Finally, I included the school’s average
percentage of students attending school daily as reported by the school
202

See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 137, at 16–17.
See 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 165, at 25.
204 See Welch & Payne, supra note 183, at 28 (“School urbanicity is one feature associated with increased
student punishment . . . .”).
205 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 165, at 28–29.
206 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 155, at 16.
207 Middle schools are “schools in which the lowest grade is not lower than grade 4 and the highest grade
is not higher than grade 9.” NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, CRIME, VIOLENCE, DISCIPLINE, AND SAFETY IN
U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS: FINDINGS FROM THE SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY: 2009–10, at 7 tbl.1 n.5
(2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011320.pdf. High schools are “schools in which the lowest
grade is not lower than grade 9 and the highest grade is not higher than grade 12.” Id. Combined schools
include “other combinations of grades, including K–12 schools.” Id.
208 2009–2010 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 155, at 17.
203
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principals (student attendance),209 which also has been linked to increases in
school violence.210
Because several of the continuous independent variables were positively
skewed, I transformed each of the continuous variables by including its natural
log.211 I did this for all the independent variables except the dummy variables
(geographic region, urbanicity, building level, nontraditional school, and
involvement of various community organizations), the ordinal variable of
neighborhood crime, and the school disorder index.212
D. Empirical Methodology
Each of the four dependent variables represents whether a school employed
various combinations of criminal-justice-oriented security measures. If a
school employed all of the methods in a certain combination, it was given a
value of “1.” If it did not employ all of the methods in a certain combination, it
was given a value of “0.” Because each of the dependent variables was
dichotomous, I used binary logistic regression to estimate the odds that a
school employed a specific combination of strict security measures.213 I
conducted all empirical analyses using a computer program called SPSS.214 In
addition, to produce optimal national estimates, I used the weighted variable
provided in the SSOCS database.215 The sample for this study includes

209

Id.
Kevin P. Brady, Sharon Balmer & Deinya Phenix, School–Police Partnership Effectiveness in Urban
Schools: An Analysis of New York City’s Impact Schools Initiative, 39 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 455, 456 (2007).
211 See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 137, at 18–19 (transforming continuous variables by including their
natural logs to correct for positive skewness).
212 Id.
213 See generally JOSEPH F. HAIR, JR. ET AL., MULTIVARIATE DATA ANALYSIS 276–81 (5th ed. 1998)
(providing an overview of logistic regression analysis).
214 For more information on SPSS, see Inst. for Digital Research & Educ., SPSS Starter Kit, UCLA.EDU,
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/STAT/spss/sk/default.htm (last visited July 25, 2013).
215 The weighted variable compensates for unequal probabilities of selection, minimizes bias associated
with responding and nonresponding schools, reduces sampling error, and calibrates the data to known
population characteristics to produce optimal national estimates. See 2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL,
supra note 165, at 13 (describing the specific weighting procedures employed); see also Ibrahim S. Yansaneh,
Construction and Use of Sample Weights ch. 5.3 (U.N. Group of Experts Meeting to Review the Draft
Handbook on Designing of Household Sample Surveys, Draft U.N. Doc. ESA/STAT/AC.91/5, 2003), available
at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/meetings/egm/Sampling_1203/docs/no_5.pdf. Furthermore, I adjusted the
sample weight created by NCES by dividing it by its mean to create a mean weight of one. This is a
recommended procedure when employing logistic regression analysis using SPSS. See Marks & Nance, supra
note 165, at 14; Patty Glynn, Adjusting or Normalizing Weights “On the Fly” in SPSS, U. OF WASH.,
http://staff.washington.edu/ glynn/adjspss.pdf (last updated July 8, 2004).
210
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approximately 910 middle schools, 950 high schools, and 110 combined
schools, for an approximate total of 1,970 schools.216
E. Results
Figure 1 shows the total number of schools in the sample that employed a
certain combination of security measures. Figure 2 shows the estimate of the
total number of schools nationally that employed a certain combination of
security measures. As the data indicate, while only a relatively small
percentage of schools applied combinations of strict security measures, the
estimated number of schools applying combinations of strict security measures
across the country is quite large, potentially affecting hundreds of thousands or
even millions of students’ everyday lives.217

216 Pursuant to the guidelines for presenting results from the restricted-use SSOCS database, raw sample
numbers have been rounded to the nearest ten. U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., RESTRICTED-USE DATA PROCEDURES
MANUAL 20 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs96/96860rev.pdf.
217 For example, the average high school in the United States has between 700 and 800 students. See
Overview of Public Elementary and Secondary Schools and Districts: School Year 1999–2000, NAT’L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATS. (Sept. 2001), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/overview/table05.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2013).
Multiplying 700 students by 3,344 schools produces a rough estimate of 2,340,800 students.
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FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF SCHOOLS IN SAMPLE USING COMBINATIONS OF STRICT
SECURITY MEASURES
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Notes:

Comb. #2

Comb. #3

Comb. #4

Combination 1 includes metal detectors and guards.
Combination 2 includes metal detectors, guards, and random sweeps.
Combination 3 includes metal detectors, guards, random sweeps, and security
cameras.
Combination 4 includes metal detectors, guards, random sweeps, security
cameras, and locked gates.

FIGURE 2. ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF SCHOOLS NATIONALLY THAT USE
COMBINATIONS OF STRICT SECURITY MEASURES
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Combination 1 includes metal detectors and guards.
Combination 2 includes metal detectors, guards, and random sweeps.
Combination 3 includes metal detectors, guards, random sweeps, and security
cameras.
Combination 4 includes metal detectors, guards, random sweeps, security
cameras, and locked gates.
Population estimates calculated from the sample weights provided by NCES. See
2009–2010 RESTRICTED-USE MANUAL, supra note 165, at 13 (describing
appropriate uses for sample weights provided by NCES).
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Table 1 contains the results of the logistic regression analysis. It displays
the exponentiated coefficients (Exp(B)) for the independent variables in each
of the models.218 An exponentiated coefficient estimates the change in odds of
a school using a combination of certain security practices for each one-unit
increase in an independent variable.219 Table 1 also displays whether the
effects of the independent variables are statistically significant.220

218 The variance inflation factors (VIF), a common statistic to detect multicollinearity, indicated that
multicollinearity was not a problem for the models. In addition, the Hosmer & Lemeshow test, a statistical test
to assess a lack of fit between the data and the model, indicated a goodness of fit for each of the models.
219 See Raymond E. Wright, Logistic Regression, in READING AND UNDERSTANDING MULTIVARIATE
STATISTICS 217, 223 (Laurence G. Grimm & Paul R. Yarnold eds., 1995) (“The odds ratio estimates the
change in the odds of membership in the target group for a one-unit increase in the predictor.”). For example,
hypothetically, if the odds ratio for the independent variable “% minority” were two, then the odds of a school
employing a certain combination of strict security measures would be twice greater for schools having a
minority population of fifty percent than for schools having a minority population of forty-nine percent.
220 Statistical significance measures the likelihood of whether the regression coefficient, or the effect of
the independent variable, is different from zero in the population of schools from which the sample was drawn.
Id. at 226–27.
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TABLE 1. LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING ODDS OF SCHOOL USING
COMBINATION OF SECURITY PRACTICES (EXP(B) REPORTED)
Comb. 1
School Crime
Violence (ln)
.837
Weapons (ln)
.995
Thefts (ln)
.818*
Drugs (ln)
1.141
Vandalism (ln)
1.034
Threats (ln)
.978
1.141
School Disorder
1.036
Neighborhood Crime
Cmty. Involvement
Parents
1.168
Social Services
1.115
Juvenile Justice
1.878
Law Enforcement
1.118
Mental Health
1.340
Civic Orgs.
.819
Business Orgs.
1.108
Rel. Orgs.
1.158
Geographic Regiona
Northeast
1.382
Midwest
.872
West
.171***
Urbanicityb
Suburban
.394***
Town
.511*
Rural
.411**
Building Levelc
Middle
.865
Combined
.705
1.356
Nontraditional
.667
Stud. Attendance (ln)
Special Ed. (%) (ln)
1.106
LEP (%) (ln)
.660***
Low Test Score (%) (ln) 1.231
2.771***
Student Pop. (ln)
Minority (%) (ln)
1.877***
Poverty (%) (ln)
7.734***
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Comb. 2

Comb. 3

Comb. 4

.925
.821
.850
1.137
1.071
.916
1.236
.842

.944
.938
.805
1.153
1.112
.883
1.337
.764

.908
1.048
.835
.988
1.152
.825
1.366
.572**

1.708*
1.221
1.074
1.092
1.588
.734
1.293
1.124

1.574
1.169
1.292
.907
1.322
.831
1.274
1.148

1.594
1.548
1.220
.980
1.310
.539*
1.325
1.484

.730
.540
.203***

.789
.538
.119

.516
.417*
.135***

.376**
.519
.589

.375
.516
.624

.358**
.305*
.312**

1.200
1.236
1.544
1.022
1.014
.699***
1.436**
3.133***
2.853***
2.236***

.963
.668
1.263
.881
.999
.711***
1.313*
2.423***
2.603***
2.311**

1.176
.939
1.174
.623
1.076
.637***
1.222
2.618***
3.359***
3.412**
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Notes: Combination 1 includes metal detectors and guards.
Combination 2 includes metal detectors, guards, and random sweeps.
Combination 3 includes metal detectors, guards, random sweeps, and security
cameras.
Combination 4 includes metal detectors, guards, random sweeps, security
cameras, and locked gates.
a. Southern states were the comparison group.
b. Urban schools were the comparison group.
c. High schools were the comparison group.

All four models demonstrate that a school’s percentage of minority
students is a strong predictor of whether the school uses a combination of strict
security measures. Stated another way, as the school’s percentage of minority
students increases, the odds of using combinations of security measures also
increases. This is true even after controlling for other important factors that
may influence the decision to employ strict security measures, such as school
crime, neighborhood crime, and school disorder. In addition, in all four
models, student poverty is a strong predictor for using a combination of strict
security measures. These findings suggest that schools serving high
percentages of low-income students or minority students are more inclined to
rely on heavy-handed, justice-oriented measures to control crime and maintain
order than other schools that confront similar crime and discipline issues.
Another interesting finding is that, in all four models, the odds of relying
on strict security measures were greater for schools with larger student
populations than for schools with smaller student populations. While the
precise reasons for this finding are unclear, it suggests that schools with large
student populations, especially those that serve large populations of lowincome or minority students, may lack the resources needed to address school
crime and disorder in alternative ways. Perhaps school officials are simply
overwhelmed by the large number of students and believe that they must rely
on shortcut methods such as metal detectors and random sweeps to combat
student crime. Indeed, educators in large schools may find it more difficult to
develop meaningful relationships with students and to watch for signs of
trouble.221 Further, large schools may not be in a financial position to hire
additional personnel to properly implement the alternative programs described
below, but instead rely on money from federal and state governments to
purchase strict security measures.222
221 See Ascher, supra note 120, at 3 (“The inability of teachers and other school staff to make meaningful
connections with students in large schools and increasingly large classes has become a key safety issue.”).
222 See infra Part IV.B.
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The analysis also reveals that geographic region is a strong predictor of
whether a school uses a combination of strict security measures. In three of the
models, the odds for using strict security measures were greater for schools in
the South than for schools in the West. In one of the models, the odds were
greater for schools in the South than for schools in the Midwest. This provides
support for the claim that schools in the South continue to maintain a strong
disciplinary approach in schools.223
In addition, in three of the four models, the odds of using a combination of
security measures were greater for urban schools than suburban schools.
Furthermore, in two of the models, the odds of using a combination of
measures were greater for urban schools than for schools located in suburban,
town, and rural areas. These findings confirm what has been observed
anecdotally—that large, urban schools that serve low-income students or
minority students are more likely to create intense surveillance environments
for students than other schools.224 Again, it is important to emphasize that
these findings hold true even when controlling for other important conditions
including school crime, disorder, and neighborhood crime.
The percentage of students who have limited English proficiency also was
a strong predictor in all of the models, but it was negatively related to the use
of security measures. That is, as the percentage of students who have limited
English proficiency increased, the odds of using combinations of measures
decreased. A possible explanation for this relationship is that school officials
perceive students who have limited English proficiency to be less threatening.
In general, other school characteristics, such as average student attendance,
being a charter or magnet school, the percentage of special education students,
and building level were not strong predictors. But there was one interesting
exception. In two of the models, the percentage of students receiving low test
scores was a significant predictor. However, because causal relationships and
temporal order cannot be detected from this dataset, one cannot discern
whether (a) applying security measures had a negative impact on the learning
environment, (b) officials applied strict security measures to push low-

223

See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 137, at 16–17.
See, e.g., Brady, Balmer, & Phenix, supra note 210, at 456–57 (“An increasing fear of school violence
coupled with the public’s misperceptions of [school safety] . . . has caused school officials, especially those
located in urban areas, to implement more punitive-based . . . policies . . . .”); Noguera, supra note 122, at 206
(noting that most urban high schools “rely upon coercion or excessive forms of control” to ensure school
safety).
224
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performing students out of school, or (c) there is no causal relationship at all,
but only a positive correlational relationship.
The involvement of external community organizations in schools’ efforts to
promote safe and disciplined schools generally was not a strong predictor for
employing combinations of security measures. Nevertheless, two notable
exceptions emerged. First, although parent involvement generally was not a
strong predictor in the models, it was in one model. Relative to the
combination that included metal detectors, guards, and random sweeps,
schools indicating that parents were involved in their efforts to create safe
schools were more likely to impose that combination. This suggests that, at
least in some cases, parents wanted schools to employ such methods to keep
children safe. Second, the involvement of civic organizations was a negative
predictor in one model.
Finally, and interestingly, the data generally do not indicate any
relationships between the number of criminal incidents reported and the use of
security measures. But there was one exception. The number of thefts was
negatively related to the combination that included metal detectors and guards.
Nevertheless, because causality and temporal order cannot be detected from
the data, the data do not allow one to conclude that the strict security measures
actually caused a decrease in the number of thefts in the schools.225
IV. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment as providing
students with almost no protection from strict security measures, especially
from measures considered to be “minimally intrusive.”226 Further, federal and
state laws have actively encouraged the use of strict security measures by
providing schools with money to implement these measures and enacting
accountability laws that appear to motivate school officials to push lowperforming students out of school.227 This empirical analysis reveals what has
emerged nationally inside of this framework. Even when taking into account
other important variables that might influence schools to adopt strict security
measures such as school crime, school disorder, and neighborhood crime,
schools serving low-income students and minority students are much more
likely to adopt measures that create an intense school climate than schools
225
226
227

See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 137, at 24–25.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Parts I.C–D.
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serving other students. Thus, while school crime, neighborhood crime, and
school disorder no doubt influence some schools to adopt strict security
measures, this study finds that those factors do not fully explain school
officials’ decision to do so. Rather, this study suggests that the racial and
socioeconomic makeup of the students may also account for this decision. As
new funding for school security measures now becomes available for schools
after Newtown, there is a danger that these disparities may continue or even
worsen. But disparity in the use of strict security measures along racial and
economic lines is only one important reason to divert government funding
away from strict security measures. Another important reason is that there are
better ways to curb school and community violence—ways that will enhance
rather than degrade the learning environment.
Part IV consists of three subsections. Section A discusses the implications
of the empirical findings. Section B describes alternative measures that schools
can adopt to promote school safety without deteriorating the learning
environment. Finally, section C proposes other recommendations to address
the disproportionate use of strict security measures on minorities and lowincome students.
A. The Empirical Findings Raise Serious Concerns
The empirical findings provide support for the theory that the primary
mission of schools that serve low-income and minority students may “not [be]
to educate, but to ensure ‘custody and control.’”228 The findings suggest that
school officials’ mindset in these schools may be to counter violence with
force; to curb school crime by creating intense environments designed to
coerce students into compliance; and to create safe schools by identifying,
apprehending, and excluding students that have the potential to be
disruptive.229 The findings also suggest that schools serving primarily affluent
or white students implement alternative ways to curb school crime. This is not
to say, however, that schools serving affluent and white students do not rely on
any security measures at all. They do. However, schools working with these
student populations tend to rely on different, less intrusive and more covert
measures, such as surveillance cameras.230 As Paul Hirschfield observes,
“[C]riminalization in middle class schools is less intense and more fluid than in
228

See Wacquant, supra note 138, at 108.
See Hirschfield, supra note 110, at 45; Noguera, supra note 122, at 192.
230 See ROBERS ET AL., supra note 90, at 164 (disaggregating the use of security measures by racial and
socioeconomic categories of students).
229
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the inner-city . . . . In short, the gated community may be a more apt metaphor
to describe the security transformation of affluent schools, while the prison
metaphor better suits that of inner-city schools.”231 Educational scholar Pedro
Noguera sums up his extensive knowledge of the public school system as
follows: “I frequently visit schools in suburban communities and private
schools that serve affluent students and see quite clearly that poor children in
the inner city are more likely to receive an education that places greater
emphasis on order and control than academic rigor.”232
Noguera offers a compelling explanation for why schools serving
disadvantaged students tend to adopt strict security measures. He observes that
schools traditionally carry out three primary functions: (1) to sort children
based on their academic abilities and put them on trajectories that will
influence their future economic roles and occupations, (2) to socialize children
by teaching them values and norms that are central to our democratic society,
and (3) to provide an important custodial function by caring for and protecting
children while they are away from home.233 While each function is important
and challenging, schools cannot accomplish the first two functions without
maintaining order and control.234 During the sorting process, children soon
learn where they stand and develop certain expectations regarding their future
economic roles and occupations.235 Students eventually begin to understand
that some of them will assume leadership roles in private and public
institutions and will prosper; others will achieve at least minimum economic
security; but others will fill dead-end jobs, receive low wages, and become
subordinated.236 Students who begin to comprehend that the educational
process is not working for them—that they most likely will not enter college or
have a promising career—typically are the students who are most disruptive to
the educational process.237 They question the educational system, push back

231 Hirschfield, supra note 150, at 84. Recent data from the U.S. Department of Education also show that
schools that serve affluent or white populations tend to rely more on drug-sniffing dogs than other schools. See
ROBERS ET AL., supra note 90, at 165. But, as the empirical analysis presented here demonstrates, schools
serving low-income minority students are much more likely to use multiple methods that create an intense
surveillance environment than other schools. See supra Part III.
232 See Noguera, supra note 89, at 348.
233 Id. at 344.
234 Id.; see also Levin, supra note 21, at 1648–49.
235 Noguera, supra note 89, at 344.
236 Id.
237 Id.; see also STEINBERG, ALLENSWORTH & JOHNSON, supra note 125, at 27–31 (finding that the
academic skills of the students are strongly related to school safety); PAUL WILLIS, LEARNING TO LABOR: HOW
WORKING CLASS KIDS GET WORKING CLASS JOBS 72 (1977) (arguing that for students who believe that
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against the mandatory attendance policies, disrupt classroom activities, and
seek other, often illegitimate, means to establish their identity, self-worth, and
status in their communities and among their peers.238
School officials generally understand that students on a dead-end
educational path typically cause more trouble in schools.239 However, instead
of focusing their efforts on meeting students’ challenging needs, inspiring
them, or helping them to discover an alternative path, schools will often focus
on maintaining order and discipline.240 Thus, schools with disproportionate
numbers of academically unsuccessful students, many of which are in the inner
city and serve low-income, minority students, often will use extreme forms of
discipline and control that include implementing strict security measures.241 As
Noguera observes, “Such schools often operate more like prisons than schools.
They are more likely to rely on guards, metal detectors, and surveillance
cameras to monitor and control students, restrict access to bathrooms, and
attempt to regiment behavior by adopting an assortment of rules and
restrictions.”242
The empirical findings presented here provide support for Noguera’s
theory. They demonstrate that large, urban schools serving historically
disadvantaged student populations are more likely to create intense
environments than other schools.243 Indeed, low-income and minority students
attending large, inner-city schools often face unique, difficult challenges in
schools and, too often, those schools do not meet their needs. No doubt many
educators teaching in these environments genuinely try to help troubled
students understand the benefits of receiving an education.244 However, there is
evidence that some educators and school administrators in impoverished areas
believe that troubled students are prison-bound,245 or at least there is evidence

knowledge and credentials acquired in schools are irrelevant, “the teachers’ authority becomes increasingly the
random one of the prison guard, not the necessary one of the pedagogue”).
238 See STEINBERG, ALLENSWORTH & JOHNSON, supra note 125, at 46 (maintaining that lower-achieving
students are less likely to be engaged in school, more likely to feel frustrated by their performance, more likely
to act out, and less likely to respond to academic punishments).
239 Noguera, supra note 89, at 344.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 345.
242 Id.
243 See supra Part III, Table 1 and accompanying discussion.
244 See Hirschfield, supra note 150, at 92.
245 Id.
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that students perceive that their teachers view them as such.246 Furthermore,
although many educators may wish to reverse the downward trajectory and
help troubled students succeed in school, they believe that their schools lack
the resources to assist those students,247 especially without compromising the
quality of education for other students.248 And, lamentably, while educators in
these environments may lack the resources necessary to reduce class sizes,
adequately train teachers, and provide counselors, mentors, mental health
experts, and behavior specialists,249 the government provides resources to pay
for strict security measures.250 Thus, school authorities often adopt measures
that institute order and control and willingly remove students who contribute to
a disorderly environment.
These findings also provide support for the growing consensus that racial
status is strongly related to punitive measures taken in schools.251 In a report
issued in August 2012 by UCLA’s Civil Rights Project, Daniel Losen and
Jonathan Gillespie analyzed data publicized by the OCR.252 That report reveals
that one out of every six black students enrolled in K–12 public schools has
been suspended at least once, but only one out of twenty white students has
been suspended.253 Worse, one out of every four disabled black children was
suspended during the 2009–2010 school year.254
Losen and Gillespie explain that because the OCR data do not contain the
reasons for suspensions, their report does not provide definitive answers for

246 Michelle Fine et al., Civics Lessons: The Color and Class of Betrayal, 106 TCHRS. C. REC. 2193,
2204–05 (2004) (finding that students believed that their teachers considered them to be “animals,” “inmates,”
or “killers”); Pedro A. Noguera, The Trouble with Black Boys: The Role and Influence of Environmental and
Cultural Factors on the Academic Performance of African American Males, 38 URB. EDUC. 431, 448 (2003)
(finding that black students were much less likely than white students to believe that their teachers support and
care about them).
247 Ascher, supra note 120, at 4 (describing the pressures that many urban educators teaching
disadvantaged students face, making those educators feel frustrated, overworked, stressed, cynical, and burned
out).
248 See Hirschfield, supra note 150, at 92.
249 See Ascher, supra note 120, at 3–4 (describing the inadequate resources of many urban school serving
disadvantaged populations).
250 See supra Part I.C.
251 Welch & Payne, supra note 183, at 28.
252 DANIEL J. LOSEN & JONATHAN GILLESPIE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED:
THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF DISCIPLINARY EXCLUSION FROM SCHOOL 6 (2012), available at
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-folder/
federal-reports/upcoming-ccrr-research/losen-gillespie-opportunity-suspended-2012.pdf.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 7.
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why these disparities exist.255 Nevertheless, other studies demonstrate that
black students are indeed punished disproportionately relative to their
offenses.256 For example, using a national sample of 294 schools, scholars
Kelly Welch and Allison Ann Payne found that schools with greater
percentages of black students were likely to impose harsher penalties for
misbehavior such as automatic suspension, expulsion, and notifying the
police.257 They also found that schools with more black students and more lowincome students were less likely to use milder forms of punishment, such as
referrals to visit school counselors or oral reprimands.258 Furthermore, they
found that schools with more black students were less supportive of alternative
forms of discipline, such as community service and restorative justice
programs.259 Other studies show similar racial disparities with respect to school
discipline.260 Thus, my study illuminates only a portion of the widespread
racial inequalities that exist in our nation’s public schools.261
B. Alternative Measures More Effectively Reduce Violence
The disproportionate use of strict security measures on minority and lowincome students is a compelling reason for policymakers not to make funds
available to schools to purchase these measures. But another compelling reason
is that school officials can do more to reduce violence in their schools and
255

Id. at 32–33.
See Ciolfi & Ryan, supra note 10, at 327–28 (citing studies demonstrating that students of color are
punished disproportionality relative to their behavior).
257 Welch & Payne, supra note 183, at 36.
258 Id. at 36–37.
259 Id. at 37.
260 See, e.g., TONY FABELO ET AL., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 45 (2011), available at
http://justicecenter.csg.org/files/Breaking_Schools_Rules_Report_Final.pdf (showing that in a statewide Texas
study that blacks were disproportionately likely to be disciplined for “discretionary reasons” and more likely to
be removed from class); Catherine P. Bradshaw et al., Multilevel Exploration of Factors Contributing to the
Overrepresentation of Black Students in Office Disciplinary Referrals, 102 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 508, 508 (2010)
(finding that after controlling for teacher ratings of students’ behavior problems, black students were more
likely than white students to receive office disciplinary referrals); DANIEL J. LOSEN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT, DISCIPLINE POLICIES, SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS, AND RACIAL JUSTICE 4 (2011), available at
http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/NEPC-SchoolDiscipline.pdf.
261 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Yet, disturbingly, there is currently almost no legal recourse
to address these racial inequalities. See Glennon, supra note 10, at 120–24 (describing the limitations of
addressing racial inequalities in public schools under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Skiba, Eckes & Brown, supra note 10, at 1089–1100 (describing the limitations of
addressing racial inequalities in public schools under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964). In a subsequent research project, I intend to propose an alternative framework to address
the disparate use of strict security measures on minorities.
256
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communities by adopting alternative measures. While strict security measures
are visible, tangible responses to address school violence that might provide
superficial comfort,262 they do not address what is truly needed: to help
children become ethical, well-rounded, productive members of our society who
can resolve conflicts without resorting to violence.263 At a recent conference
for community members in New Jersey, “Safe and Secure Schools:
Perspectives After Newtown,” keynote speaker Maurice Elias reminded
attendees that “our children cannot learn, and our teachers cannot teach, in
schools that are unsafe, unsupportive, uncaring, uncivil or lacking in
intellectual challenge . . . . These are the ultimate sources of security to
children and in ways that are more lasting than metal detectors.”264 Similarly,
after the Columbine shootings, the U.S. Secret Service and the Department of
Education issued a joint report concluding that a fundamental component for
reducing school violence is to improve the school’s climate and strengthen
trust and communication among students and educators.265 As that report
emphasized,
In educational settings that support climates of safety, adults and
students respect each other. A safe school environment offers positive
personal role models in its faculty. It provides a place for open
discussion where diversity and differences are respected;
communication between adults and students is encouraged and
266
supported; and conflict is managed and mediated constructively.

Indeed, after conducting a comprehensive study of school safety in the
Chicago public school system, scholars Matthew Steinberg, Elaine
Allensworth, and David Johnson concluded that even in schools serving large
populations of students from areas of high crime and high poverty, “it is the
262 See Ascher, supra note 120, at 4 (maintaining that metal detectors and other mechanical devices only
provide a false sense of safety).
263 Id. at 7 (describing the benefits for children of adopting alternative methods to reduce school
violence).
264 Joe Green, South Jersey Schools Discuss Safety Following ‘Perspectives After Newtown,’ NJ.COM
(Jan. 23, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.nj.com/gloucester-county/index.ssf/2013/01/south_jersey_schools_to_
talk_s.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
265 See ROBERT A. FEIN ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THREAT ASSESSMENT IN
SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND TO CREATING SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES 11–
12 (2002), available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ssi_guide.pdf. This report was recently emphasized
by the Obama administration after the Newtown shootings. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NOW IS THE TIME 12–13
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh_now_is_the_time_full.pdf.
266 FEIN ET AL., supra note 265, at 11; see also FEDDERS, LANGBERG & STORY, supra note 89, at 6
(“Positive relationships among students, families, teachers, administrators, and staff are the most effective
tools in creating a safe school environment.”).
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quality of relationships between staff and students and between staff and
parents that most strongly defines safe schools.”267
We certainly cannot prevent all acts of violence at school or elsewhere. But
we can do more to help students develop social and emotional stability,
improve their attitudes about themselves and others, decrease their levels of
emotional stress, teach them how to resolve conflicts peacefully, and help them
develop positive relationships with their teachers, other adults, and their
peers.268 Such initiatives will do more to curb violence in schools and in
communities—and help students to become more well-rounded and prepared
for the workforce—than strict security measures ever could. This section will
describe specific, alternative methods that schools can implement to achieve
these results.
First, a program called Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports
(PBIS) is a well-respected, data-driven initiative that provides strategies for
defining, teaching, and supporting appropriate behavior to create strong
learning environments for an entire district or school.269 PBIS is a decisionmaking framework that helps educators select and implement evidence-based
practices to improve academic and behavioral outcomes for all students.270
Under this program, educators develop a set of behavior interventions and
supports, use data to solve problems, modify the environment to prevent
problems from developing and occurring, teach and support appropriate skills
and behaviors, implement the social and behavioral practices with consistency
and accountability, and continually monitor progress.271
267
268

STEINBERG, ALLENSWORTH, & JOHNSON, supra note 125, at 1.
As scholar Jim Ryan reminds us,
From the birth of the common school movement through early desegregation cases, schools were
seen not simply as places where students learned how to read and write but also as places where
they learned how to become better citizens. Indeed, for a long time, the socializing or civic
mission of schools was considered by many to be just as important as the academic mission.

James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 143 (2007) (footnote
omitted).
269 See FEDDERS, LANGBERG & STORY, supra note 89, at 8 (recommending PBIS as a proven measure to
improve school safety); LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 252, at 43; Mayer & Leone, supra note 88, at 13
(explaining that PBIS is an approach that “transforms the school environment to support overall student
success, behaviorally, socially, and academically”); School-Wide PBIS, POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS &
SUPPORTS, http://www.pbis.org/school/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 13, 2013) (describing school-wide
PBIS).
270 See What Is School-Wide Positive Behavioral Interventions & Supports?, POSITIVE BEHAV.
INTERVENTIONS & SUPPORTS, http://www.pbis.org/school/what_is_swpbs.aspx (lasted visited Aug. 13, 2013).
271 Id.
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The program takes a multi-tiered approach. The first tier consists of
providing a system-wide set of prevention strategies for all students, staff, and
settings that include defining, teaching, and rewarding appropriate behavior.272
Second-tier strategies consist of intensive prevention initiatives directed at
specialized groups of students who did not respond positively to the systemwide approach.273 Core elements of the second-tier strategies include
screenings, progress monitoring, systems for increasing structure and
predictability, contingent adult feedback, and increasing home and school
communication.274 Finally, third-tier strategies are directed at students who did
not respond positively to the second-tier prevention strategies.275 Those
strategies include developing team-based, highly individualized plans to assist
students with their needs.276 In sum, this program creates learning
environments that are more inclusive, productive, and engaging, and of course,
safer for both students and educators.277 It has been successful in all settings,
including urban schools and in the juvenile justice system.278
Second, the practice of restorative justice is another alternative approach to
top-down, authoritarian discipline regimes that rely on strict security measures.
Restorative justice practices are dispute resolution tools that involve both the
victims and offenders.279 These practices “focus on repairing the harm,
engaging victims, establishing accountability, developing a community, and
preventing future actions.”280 Through formal and informal conferences,
victims share with offenders how they have been hurt by the offenders’
actions, and the offenders have opportunities to make apologies.281 During the
272 Id.; see also Is School-Wide Positive Behavior Support an Evidence-Based Practice?, POSITIVE
BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS & SUPPORTS (March 2009), http://www.pbis.org/research/default.aspx.
273 See What Is School-Wide Positive Behavioral Interventions & Support?, supra note 270.
274 See Is School-Wide Positive Behavior Support an Evidence-Based Practice?, supra note 272.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id.; see also Mayer & Leone, supra note 88, at 13 (explaining the benefits of implementing PBIS for
students).
278 See Frequently Asked Questions, POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS & SUPPORTS, http://www.pbis.org/
school/primary_level/faqs.aspx (last visited Aug. 13, 2013); see also Domenici & Forman Jr., supra note 107,
at 290 (employing successfully a modified version of PBIS in a school inside of a juvenile justice facility to
encourage students to behave according to school values).
279 N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, SAFETY WITH DIGNITY: ALTERNATIVES TO THE OVER-POLICING OF
SCHOOLS 8 (2009), available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/Safety_with_Dignity.pdf.
280 Thalia N. C. González & Benjamin Cairns, Moving Beyond Exclusion: Integrating Restorative
Practices and Impacting School Culture in Denver Public Schools, in JUSTICE FOR KIDS: KEEPING KIDS OUT
OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 241, 241.
281 Id.; see also Laura Mirsky, Building Safer, Saner Schools, 69 EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Sept. 2011, at 45,
45–49 (2011); Laura Mirsky, SaferSanerSchools: Transforming School Culture with Restorative Practices,
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conferences, both the victims and offenders devise remedies for the wrong
committed.282 Restorative justice initiatives teach all students to share feelings
in response to undesirable behavior from other students, which has the effect of
humanizing victims and changing the dynamics of those involved in the
incidents.283
The following example is provided to illustrate the benefits of restorative
justice. After a student broke a window in the Humanities Preparatory
Academy in Manhattan, New York, the student participated in a restorative
justice conference.284 During the session, participants discovered that the day
before the incident, the student had received notice that his family was being
removed from its shelter and had no place to go.285 Because this did not excuse
his behavior, the offender and the committee members decided that he needed
to give back to the school community.286 Understanding that the student could
not afford to replace the window, the session participants jointly decided that
the offender would help answer an office phone after school for a month.287
During that time, his advisor and a social worker contacted the student’s family
to offer support.288
While breaking a window is less serious than an assault or, worse, a
shooting, a central theme to the practice of restorative justice is to teach
students early about the consequences of their actions and to allow them to
restore their integrity, reputation, and self-esteem as they seek to make amends
for their wrongful actions.289 By participating in restorative justice initiatives,
students will avoid serious offenses later in their lives. But even when students
engage in more serious offenses, restorative justice practices can help put
students back on track to avoid even more serious offenses in the future.
Schools that have implemented restorative justice practices have shown
RESTORATIVE PRACS. EFORUM 1 (May 20, 2003), http://www.iirp.edu/iirpWebsites/web/uploads/article_pdfs/
ssspilots.pdf.
282 See Mirsky, Building Safer, Saner Schools, supra note 281, at 45–49; Mirsky, SaferSanerSchools,
supra note 281, at 1; cf. Catherine J. Ross, A Place at the Table: Creating Presence and Voice for Teenagers
in Dependency Proceedings, 6 NEV. L.J. 1362, 1365 (2006) (“We have known for decades that involving
young people in decision-making promotes more positive outcomes.”).
283 See Mirsky, Building Safer, Saner Schools, supra note 281, at 45–49.
284 See N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 279, at 18.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 See González & Cairns, supra note 280, at 243 (“Central to the restorative practice is the maintenance
of individuals’ dignity and sense of self-worth.”).
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tremendous results. For example, West Philadelphia High School, formerly
known as one of Philadelphia’s most dangerous schools, posted strong results
after implementing restorative justice initiatives.290 After the first year, violent
acts and serious incidents decreased by fifty-two percent; after the second year,
violent acts and serious incidents decreased by an additional forty percent.291
Several other schools implementing restorative justice practices also have
improved school safety.292
Third, educators can enhance safety and order in their schools by
improving the strength and quality of classroom activities.293 Having wellplanned lessons and a varied instructional approach that includes hands-on
learning activities, clear and well-defined behavioral expectations, teaching
strategies that are targeted to meet students’ individual needs, and an
empathetic approach focused on engaging and continually re-engaging
students are vital to a safe learning environment.294 Such an environment
provides students with a sense of purpose, commitment, and personal
responsibility. It can help students feel that the educational process will work
for them if they trust their teachers and commit themselves to the process. And
above all, students need to feel and understand that teachers care about them,
that teachers want them to succeed, that teachers believe that they can succeed,
and that teachers are willing to do what it takes to help them succeed.295
290 INT’L INST. FOR RESTORATIVE PRACTICES, IMPROVING SCHOOL CLIMATE: FINDINGS FROM SCHOOLS
IMPLEMENTING RESTORATIVE PRACTICES 6 (2009), available at http://www.iirp.edu/pdf/IIRP-ImprovingSchool-Climate.pdf.
291 Id. at 7.
292 Id. at 9–31; see also González & Cairns, supra note 280, at 252–53 (describing the benefits of
restorative justice initiatives); cf. Martha Minow, Education for Co-Existence, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002)
(“Experts believe that teaching students how to negotiate and communicate, and how to mediate conflicts, can
enhance students’ capacities to cooperate and to employ self-control, thereby reducing incidents of aggression
at school.”). While West Philadelphia High School and perhaps other schools using restorative justice
programs have not completely abandoned using strict security measures, implementing alternative measures to
curb violence is an encouraging sign.
293 LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 252, at 36; see also MICHAEL ESKENAZI, GILLIAN EDDINS & JOHN M.
BEAM, EQUITY OR EXCLUSION: THE DYNAMICS OF RESOURCES, DEMOGRAPHICS, AND BEHAVIOR IN THE NEW
YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2 (2003) (finding that teacher qualifications had a strong effect on student
behavior).
294 ESKENAZI, EDDINS & BEAM, supra note 293, at 2; LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 252, at 36; see also
FEDDERS, LANGBERG, & STORY, supra note 89, at 8.
295 See FEDDERS, LANGBERG, & STORY, supra note 89, at 8 (explaining that proven preventive measures
to improve school safety include having “staff who are positive, compassionate, nurturing, caring, and
respectful; model appropriate behaviors; create a climate of emotional support; and are committed to
maintaining strong, positive relationships with all students”); STEINBERG, ALLENWORTH & JOHNSON, supra
note 125, at 1 (finding that the quality of relationships between educators and students most strongly defines
safe schools).
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Fourth, policymakers can promote safety by creating smaller schools where
students can receive individualized attention and develop personal
relationships with adults and other students.296 Where this is not possible, large
schools can divide children into smaller groups that remain together for an
extended period of time and are taught by the same group of teachers.297
Research suggests that these smaller learning environments provide students
with a better sense of community and reduce school crime.298
Fifth, schools can implement initiatives targeted to help students develop
emotional and social stability. Social and emotional learning strategies enable
students to “recognize and manage emotions, set and achieve positive goals,
appreciate the perspectives of others, establish and maintain positive
relationships, make responsible decisions, and handle interpersonal situations
constructively.”299 These programs provide instruction in understanding,
integrating, and applying social and emotional skills in many contexts, which
helps prevent violence, bullying, and substance abuse among students.300
Implementing these alternative programs to reduce school violence is not
easy, but it is possible. Six New York City schools serving at-risk students all
have successfully created safe, constructive learning environments without
relying on strict security measures.301 Common characteristics these schools
share include efforts to promote dignity and respect among all school
members; strong and compassionate leadership; open lines of communication
among students, teachers, and school officials; and establishing clear, fair rules
and disciplinary procedures.302 Notably, none of these schools use a metal
detector.303 The results truly have been remarkable. Each school enjoys above-

296

See FEDDERS, LANGBERG, & STORY, supra note 89, at 8 (maintaining that a proven method to bolster
school safety is “small classes and schools that students and staff experience as communities and where
students and staff know each other well and feel responsible for one another”); Diane Walker, Smaller
Schools: A Safer Alternative, ABOUT.COM SECONDARY EDUC., http://712educators.about.com/library/weekly/
aa032901a.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).
297 See Philip J. Cook et al., School Crime Control and Prevention, 39 CRIME & JUSTICE 313, 377 (2010).
298 Id.
299 Joseph A. Durlak et al., The Impact of Enhancing Students’ Social and Emotional Learning: A MetaAnalysis of School-Based Universal Interventions, 82 CHILD DEV. 405, 406 (2001).
300 Id.
301 See N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 279, at 7–8.
302 Id. at 7.
303 Id. Since this report was published, one of these schools was forced to install a metal detector, which
had a profound, negative result on the students. See supra pp. 17–18 and accompanying notes.
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average attendance, graduation rates, and substantially lower than average
incidents of crime and suspension rates.304
C. Further Recommendations
While school-led reform is the most important component for instituting
change, federal and state agencies must also play a role.305 An obvious place
for federal and state agencies to begin is to stop providing grants to schools for
strict security measures and make those funds available to support alternative
initiatives. This is particularly important now that federal and state
governments are considering providing money to schools for strict security
measures after the Newtown tragedy.306 I urge policymakers to use those funds
to encourage schools to implement PBIS, restorative justice, and social and
emotional learning programs; to provide training to teachers and school
officials; to grant students access to additional mental health services; and to
help schools hire more behavioral counselors and other specialists.
In addition, I encourage the U.S. Department of Education to provide
grants to researchers to study more closely the harmful effects of strict security
measures on students, especially when those measures are applied
disproportionately to low-income and minority students. The Department of
Education could disseminate the results of these studies to school districts
nationally. Further, it could recommend that schools refrain from using strict
security measures in favor of alternative, more effective methods and provide
training to school officials. State boards of education could do the same for the
schools in their respective states.
Finally, I recommend that the Department of Education’s Office of Civil
Rights play a more active role in addressing the disproportionate use of strict
security measures on minority students. The regulations to Title VI
promulgated by the OCR recognize disparate impact as a form of
discrimination.307 While a private plaintiff cannot seek relief under a Title VI

304

See N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 279, at 7.
See Glennon, supra note 10, at 107 (arguing that the federal government should take the lead in
aligning educational policy with child development and encourage schools to employ positive behavior
interventions that foster communities of trust rather than environments of distrust).
306 See supra note 3; see also THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 265, at 11 (proposing to provide $150
million to school districts and law enforcement agencies to hire, among other individuals, more law
enforcement officers to work in schools).
307 See, e.g., Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 319 (4th Cir. 2003).
305
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regulation, the OCR can enforce those regulations.308 Recently, the OCR began
investigating the discipline practices of approximately twenty school districts
to examine any racial disparities, including Oakland Unified School District
(OUSD).309 Those investigations were part of the Obama administration’s
efforts to address the overrepresentation of some racial groups in suspensions
and expulsions from school.310 The investigations have proved effective thus
far. On September 28, 2012, the Department of Education announced the
voluntary resolution of its investigation of OUSD regarding whether AfricanAmerican students were disciplined more often and more severely than white
students.311 OUSD made several commitments to address this problem. Those
commitments included agreeing to collaborate with experts to develop positive
school climates, identifying at-risk students and providing them with support
services, revising its disciplinary policies, and providing training to school
officials and educators.312 I encourage the OCR to play a similar role to
address the disproportionate use of strict security measures on minority
students.313
Following these recommendations will help rectify the disproportionate use
of strict security measures on minorities, reduce the overall number of schools
that rely on strict security measures, provide a better learning environment for
all students, and prepare children who will be more emotionally and socially
balanced and less prone to commit violent acts.
308

Id. As a policy matter, the Obama administration seems to be moving in the direction of allowing the
Department of Education to address the disparate impact of school policies. See Exec. Order No. 13,621
§ 2(b)(3)(vi), 77 Fed. Reg. 45471, 45472 (July 26, 2012); see also Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen.
for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Civil Rights and School Discipline: Addressing
Disparities to Ensure Equal Educational Opportunities Conference (Sept. 27, 2010) available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/speeches/perez_eosconf_speech.php. However, on the day the OCR released data
demonstrating disparities in disciplinary procedures, Russlyn Ali, assistant secretary for the OCR, reminded
the public that data on disparities do not necessarily prove a civil rights violation. See LOSEN & GILLESPIE,
supra note 252, at 34.
309 See Nirvi Shah, Feds: ‘Unprecedented’ Deal in Oakland on Black Student Suspensions, EDUC. WEEK
(Sept. 28, 2012, 12:44 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/District_Dossier/2012/09/feds_unprecedented_
deal_in_oak.html.
310 See Mary Ann Zehr, ‘Disparate Impact’ Discipline Policy Criticized, 20 EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 23, 2011,
at 27, 27 (2011).
311 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Announces Voluntary
Resolution of Oakland Unified School District Civil Rights Investigation (Sept. 28, 2012), available at
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-announces-voluntary-resolution-oaklandunified-school-di.
312 Id.
313 This recommendation will be the subject of a future article. In addition, in subsequent scholarly
articles, I intend to encourage courts to adopt an alternative framework to evaluate students’ rights under the
Fourth Amendment.
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CONCLUSION
The horrific massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary School has rocked our
nation. It has caused us to think deeply about violence, guns, student safety,
and school security measures. A natural response to this tragedy is to invest
millions of dollars in strict security measures to prevent further violence from
occurring. But this strategy is shortsighted and, indeed, misguided. The
empirical evidence set forth here suggests that these actions may lead to further
inequalities along racial and economic lines in our school systems. Further,
there are more effective ways to address school crime that do not harm the
educational climate. Such programs may not be easy to apply in urban schools
that face challenging conditions, but the existence of successful schools in
challenging environments provides tangible evidence that it is possible.314 In
many of these schools, including inner-city schools, students view their
experience as too special to be spoiled by crime or violence and too important
to risk suspension or expulsion. These schools have an ethos of trust and
belonging.315 Children want to attend these schools because they feel that they
are part of a special community—a community whose members care for one
another, protect one another, desire the best for one another, and expect the
best from one another.316 These are the schools that make a difference—a real
difference—in the lives of students.
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See Noguera, supra note 122, at 207.
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